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Preface	  	  	   This	   project	   is	   something	   that	   I	   have	   been	   interested	   in	   throughout	  my	  academic	  career.	  I	   first	  began	  studying	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Islam	  in	  the	  fall	   of	   my	   junior	   year,	   and	   was	   immediately	   interested	   in	   the	   religious	  tradition	  and	  the	  area	  of	  the	  world.	  However,	  the	  conflict	  between	  American	  popular	  understandings	  of	  Islam	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  tradition	  is	  something	  I	   have	   been	   interested	   in	   since	   high	   school.	   I	   grew	   up	   with	   a	   number	   of	  Iranian	  and	  Egyptian	  friends,	  all	  of	  whom	  were	  Muslim.	  	  When	  the	  Twin	  Towers	  fell,	  and	  when	  I	  would	  talk	  to	  certain	  friends	  and	   family	   about	   their	   belief	   that	   Islam	   was	   oppressive,	   I	   struggled	   to	  reconcile	   this	  with	  my	  own	  experience	  with	   Islam.	   I	   had	  never	  understood	  the	   tradition	   as	   oppressive,	   and	   rather,	   had	   noticed	   a	   variety	   of	   different	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  within	  Islam	  throughout	  my	  life.	  I	  grew	  up	  Catholic	  and	  myself	   was	   exposed	   to	   varying	   degrees	   of	   practice	   and,	   and	   difference	   in	  interpretation	   of	   religious	   text	   in	   my	   own	   upbringing.	   I	   never	   saw	   a	  difference	  in	  my	  friends’	  discussions	  of	  growing	  up	  in	  the	  Muslim	  tradition.	  It	  is	   also	  worth	  noting	   that	   I	   did	  not	  only	   see	   this	   fear	  of	   Islam	   in	   the	  United	  States.	   When	   I	   studied	   in	   Paris,	   the	   law	   banning	   burquas	   was	   being	  introduced,	   and	   I	   remember	   hearing	   this	   discussion,	   and	   again	   wondering	  why	  there	  was	  so	  much	  resistance	  to	  the	  religion.	  	  I	  initially	  set	  out	  to	  write	  a	  thesis	  specifically	  focusing	  on	  the	  religious	  rhetoric	   of	   the	   Taliban,	   and	   the	   project	   very	   quickly	   grew	   into	   a	   study	   of	  political	   Islam,	  and	   its	  historical	  developments.	  The	  project	  developed	  with	  my	   research,	   and	   I	   found	   that	   I	   was	   very	   interested	   in	   examining	   political	  Islam	  in	  light	  of	  what	  I	  perceive	  to	  be	  misconceptions	  of	  Islamism	  throughout	  the	   world.	   Even	   as	   I	   started	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   deconstructing	   these	  misconceptions,	  my	  findings	  proved	  that	  political	  Islam,	  and	  Islam	  itself	  was	  an	  even	  more	  diverse	  tradition	  than	  I	  initially	  understood.	  	  




	  	   This	   paper	   seeks	   to	   understand	   the	   ways	   that	   popular	   American	  media	  images	  and	  Western	  understandings	  of	  Islamism	  are	  unrepresentative	  of	   the	   tradition.	   Modern	   day	   media	   bombards	   the	   Western	   world	   with	  images	   of	   women	   in	   burquas,	   and	   extremist	   Islamist	   statements	   and	  evaluates	   these	   ideas	   and	   images	   with	   “Islamism”.	   This	   paper	   shows,	  however	  that	  Islamism	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  simple	  term,	  but	  is	  rather	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  ideas	  and	  values.	  	  	   As	   the	   three	   case	   studies-­‐	   the	   Taliban,	   Al	   Qaeda,	   and	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood	  highlight	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  the	  term	  Islamism.	  The	  Taliban	  was	  a	  parochial	  organization	   that	   aimed	   to	  mimic	   the	   times	  of	   the	  Prophet	  during	   its	   period	   of	   dominance	   in	   the	   late	   1990’s,	   but	   reformed	   itself	   and	  became	   a	   more	   modern	   insurgent	   movement	   post-­‐2001.	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	  meanwhile,	   demonstrates	   radical	   ideas	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   Sharia’	   and	  international	   Islamic	   governance.	   Finally,	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	  illuminates	   how	   Islamist	   policies	   can	   promote	   democracy.	   The	   stark	  differences	   among	   these	   Islamist	   organizations	   supports	   the	   claim	   that	  Islamism	   is	   not	   one	   simple	   definition,	   but	   rather,	   represents	   a	   variety	   of	  organizations	  and	  ideas	  that	  are	  constantly	  evolving.	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Introduction	  to	  the	  Topic	  	  	   Western	  views	  are	  often	  misrepresentative	  of	   Islamism.	   	  The	  United	  States’	   difficulties	   with	   the	   Islamic	   world,	   in	   addition	   to	   9/11’s	   negative	  media	   attention	   caused	   the	  Western	  world	   to	   view	   Islamism	   as	   dangerous	  and	  regressive,	  rather	  than	  a	  philosophy	  that	  embraces	  contemporary	  ideas	  and	   modernity	   as	   the	   West	   understands	   it.	   Immediately	   following	   9/11,	  videotapes	   of	   Osama	   bin	   Laden	   played	   on	   every	  major	   news	   channel	  with	  anti-­‐Western	   statements,	   as	   well	   as	   clips	   of	   American	   flags	   being	   burned	  throughout	  the	  Islamic	  world.	  A	  narrow	  understanding	  of	   Islamism	  and	  the	  Islamic	  world	   grew	   from	   these	  media	   images,	   one	   this	   paper	   hopes	   to	   de-­‐bunk.	   The	   general	   American	   public	   does	   not	   understand	   the	   nuances	   of	  political	  Islam,	  and	  the	  drive	  behind	  such	  philosophies.	  The	  question	  that	  this	  paper	  aims	  to	  answer	  is:	  How	  does	  political	  Islam	  develop	  into	  the	  different	  forms	  represented	  today,	  and	  how	  should	  this	  inform	  America’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Middle	  East?	  	  	  As	   this	   paper	  will	   show,	   Islamism	   appears	  within	   a	   broad	   range	   of	  ideological	  discourses	  and	  political	  beliefs,	  and	  does	  not	  represent	  simply	  the	  narrow	   understanding	   of	   Islamism	   implied	   by	   Western	   thought.	   Islamism	  does	   not	   simply	   aim	   to	   cripple	   the	   Western	   world,	   as	   many	   Americans	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understand	  that	  it	  does,	  but	  rather,	  a	  political	  ideology	  that	  develops	  from	  a	  rich	   tradition	   of	   scholarship	   and	   discourse.	   Because	   of	   the	   varied	  misperceptions	  surrounding	  Islamism,	  it	  is	  especially	  important	  to	  highlight	  this	   rich	   tradition,	   and	  explain	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   Islamism	   is,	  within	   itself,	  becoming	  extremely	  progressive.	  	  	   In	   the	   current	  Republican	  primary,	   there	   are	  many	   comments	  made	  about	  the	  Muslim	  community,	  and	  the	  behavior	  of	  Islamist	  organizations.	  For	  example,	   in	   a	   speech	   to	   the	   American	   public,	   Newt	   Gingrich	   likened	   the	  desire	  to	  build	  a	  mosque	  in	  the	  financial	  district	  of	  New	  York	  City	  to	  “Nazis	  building	   next	   to	   a	   Holocaust	   museum”1.	   While	   this	   is	   clearly	   a	   sweeping	  generalization,	   it	   highlights	   the	   belief	   that	   Americans	   have	   that	   Islam	   is	  attacking	  their	  own	  identity	  and	  is	  offensive.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  variety	  of	  organizations	  and	  ideologies	  within	  the	  tradition	  that	  are	  not	  explored	  by	  the	  blanket	  statements.	  	   Because	  of	  these	  blanket	  statements,	  and	  the	  American	  public’s	  lack	  of	  understanding	   on	   the	   topic,	   this	   study	   does	   not	   attempt	   to	   understand	  Islamism	  as	  one	   cohesive	  philosophy,	   but	   rather,	   seeks	   to	  unpack	   the	   term	  through	  the	  three	  case	  studies,	  and	  understand	  some	  of	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	   Islamism	   can	   manifest	   itself,	   and	   the	   different	   political	   visions	   that	  Islamism	   proposes.	   For	   the	   broader	   understanding	   of	   the	   term,	   Islamism	  
                                                
1 Islamaphobiatoday.com 
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means	  a	  political	  ideology	  with	  roots	  in	  Islam2.	  As	  this	  definition	  is	  redefined	  through	  literature	  and	  the	  aforementioned	  case	  studies,	  it	  will	  be	  understood	  the	  many	  different	  visions	  this	  broad,	  umbrella	  term	  can	  produce.	  This	  paper	  examines	   the	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   different	   Islamist	   organizations	  interpret	  Islam	  for	  political	  ends.	  	   The	   examination	   of	   this	   topic	   is	   important	   to	   develop	   a	   deeper	  understanding	   of	   the	   Islamic	   tradition,	   and	   to	   understand	   the	   fundamental	  crises	   in	   the	   Islamic	  world	   today.	  Both	   the	  Arab	  Awakening	  and	   the	   rise	  of	  fundamentalist	   groups	   like	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   demonstrate	   crisis	   within	   Islamic	  society,	  and	  cause	  one	  to	  further	  question	  how	  Islam	  should	  manifest	  itself	  in	  politics.	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   study	   is	   to	   highlight	   the	   challenges	   that	   Islam	  faces	   in	   the	   21st	   century,	   and	   how	   Islamism’s	   development	   and	   different	  representations	   represent	   this	   crisis.	   This	   study	   also	   aims	   to	   de-­‐bunk	  Western	   understandings	   of	   Islamism	   as	   a	   tradition	   steeped	   in	  fundamentalism,	   and	   aims	   to	   highlight	   the	   reasons	   why	   Western	  understandings	  represent	  vast	  oversimplification.	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  With	   regards	   to	   the	   stated	   research	  question,	   this	  paper	   should	   find	  that	   political	   Islam	   is	   represented	   in	   comparatively	   diverse	   ways	   today	  
                                                
2 Mark	  Lynch,	  “Veiled	  Truths:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Political	  Islam	  in	  the	  West”,	  (Foreign	  Affairs:	  July	  2010)	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because	  of	   the	   specific	  historical	   contexts	   that	   scholarship,	   and	   the	   specific	  movements	   grow	   from	   specific	   historical	   contexts	   and	   developments.	   The	  case	   studies	   demonstrate	   that	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	   the	   Taliban,	   and	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood	  change	  significantly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  political	  and	  social	  times	  in	  which	  they	  find	  themselves	  in.	  This	  study	  also	  finds	  that	  “Islamism”	  itself,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  political	  Islam	  is	  not	  representative	  of	  the	  tradition	  itself,	  and	  the	   reasoning	   behind	   asserting	   political	   ideas	   of	   Islam.	   As	   this	   paper	   will	  illustrate,	   Islam	   itself	   has	   political	   specifications,	   and	   for	   followers	   of	   the	  tradition,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  adhere	  to	  these	  political	  specifications.	  	  What	   this	  means	   for	   the	   US	   relationship	  with	   the	  Middle	   East	   is	   an	  increased	   understanding	   of	   the	   nuanced	   nature	   of	   Islamist	   parties.	  Perpetuating	   a	   generalized	   idea	   of	   the	   tradition	   will	   only	   fuel	  misunderstanding	   and	   increasingly	   strained	   relations.	   As	   the	   United	   States	  attempts	   to	   relate	   to	   a	   region	   changed	   by	   the	   Arab	   Awakening,	   and	   the	  emerging	   democracies	   that	   will	   come	   from	   this,	   political	   Islam	   must	   be	  understood	  in	  the	  previously	  stated	  terms.	  	  
Methodology	  This	  paper	  first	  examines	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  political	  Islam	  as	  a	  tradition.	  In	  this	  section,	  there	  will	  be	  an	  examination	  of	  prominent	  Islamist	  scholars,	  particularly	  scholars	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  chosen	  case	  studies.	  After	  an	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examination	  of	  the	  historical	  context,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  related	  to	  the	  topic	  will	  be	  conducted.	  	  This	  paper	  will	  specifically	  examine	  three	  case	  studies:	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  the	  Taliban,	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  These	  three	  case	  studies	  were	  chosen	  because	  of	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  American	  public’s	  understanding	  of	  Islamism.	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   brought	   Islamism	   into	   popular	   media	   and	   foreign	   policy	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  The	  United	  States	  has	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  Taliban	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  and	  the	  Taliban	  is	  also	  an	  important	  part	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Afghanistan.	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  has	  recently	  come	  to	  public	  attention	  following	  the	  uprising	  in	  Egypt,	  and	  the	  subsequent	   elections.	   The	   Brotherhood	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   oldest	   and	  most	  successful	   Islamist	   organizations.	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   will	   be	   the	   first	   case	   study	  because	   of	   its	   role	   in	   bringing	   Islamism	   into	   the	   American	   public’s	   eye	  following	  9/11,	  and	  the	  Taliban	  will	  follow	  because	  of	  the	  subsequent	  war	  in	  Afghanistan.	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  will	  be	  the	  final	  case	  study	  because	  of	  the	   very	   recent	  media	   attention	   it	   has	   received,	   and	   because	   of	   its	   unique	  approach	  to	  the	  democratic	  process.	  These	   three	   case	   studies	   will	   highlight	   the	   disconnect	   between	  commonly	   held	   ideas	   about	   Islamism,	   and	   the	   actuality.	   Findings	   will	   be	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included	  in	  each	  of	  the	  case	  studies,	  and	  afterwards,	  the	  paper	  will	  conclude	  by	  re-­‐evaluating	  the	  hypothesis.	  	  
Historical	  Context	  	  	   Islam	  has	  been	  an	  intrinsic	  factor	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  since	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Prophet	   and	   the	   early	   ummah	   in	   Arabia	   in	   mid	   first	  century.	   There	   are,	   however,	   historical	   events	   that	   lead	   to	   the	   explicit	  discussion	  of	   Islam	   in	  politics,	  and	   the	  role	  of	   Islam	   in	  governance.	  Prior	   to	  explicit	   discussions	   of	   the	   term	   “Islamism”,	   the	   beginnings	   of	   Islamist	  thought	   began	   to	   stir	   as	   early	   as	   the	   15th	   century,	   when	   many	   Islamic	  scholars	   called	   for	   a	   return	   to	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   Qur’an	   and	   the	   hadith	  (hereinafter	  the	  proof	  texts).	  Modern	  Islamist	  thought	  was	  born	  with	  a	  wave	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  that	  swept	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Historian	  C.	  Ernest	  Dawn,	  an	  expert	   on	   the	  Ottoman	   empire,	   focuses	   on	   the	   end	   of	   the	   First	  World	  War	  when	  he	  says,	  “Since	  1918	  the	  doctrine	  that	  the	  Arabs	  are	  a	  nation	  and	  that	  nationality	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   politics	   has	   come	   to	   be	   accepted	   by	   a	   very	   large	  majority	  of	  Arab	  political	  leaders	  and	  of	  at	  least	  the	  lay	  intellectuals”3.	  During	  this	   time,	  Arabism	  as	  a	  national	   identity	  became	  particularly	  prominent.	  As	  Arabs	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  expressed	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  and	  colonial	  powers,	  the	  question	  of	  religion	  also	  came	  
                                                
3 C. Ernest Dawn, “From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology”, (London: 
2004), 375 
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into	  play.	  By	  the	  1950’s,	  nationalist	  writing	  and	  ideas	  of	  how	  Islam	  would	  be	  involved	  in	  new	  Arab	  states	  were	  intertwined.	  	  	   The	   concept	   of	   “political	   Islam”	   or	   “Islamism”	   first	   entered	  Western	  public	  discourse	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1979	  Iranian	  Revolution,	  but	  is	  also	   “an	   American	   coinage…that	   presupposed	   that	   an	   ‘apolitical	   Islam’	   had	  been	   the	   norm…before	   1979” 4 .	   Therefore,	   understanding	   Islamism	   as	  “political	  Islam”	  does	  not	  understand	  fundamental	  tenants	  and	  aspects	  of	  the	  term.	  To	  understand	  the	  real	  roots	  of	  Islamism,	  one	  must	  go	  back,	  at	  least,	  to	  France	  in	  1883.	  At	  a	  conference	  at	  the	  Sorbonne	  on	  March	  20,	  1883,	  a	  Muslim	  figure	  named	  Sayyid	  Jamal	  al-­‐Afghani	  was	   in	  attendance,	  and	  threw	  himself	  into	   a	   debate	   that	   discussed	   the	   position	   of	   Islam	   with	   regard	   to	  modernization	   and	   science 5 .	   Prior	   to	   this	   discussion,	   the	   French	   had	  referenced	  “Islamism”.	  They	  did	  so	  simply	  as	  a	  means	  to	  define	  the	  religion	  of	  “Islam”.	   Islamism	  was	  not	  understood	  as	  a	  separate	  philosophy	  or	   ideology	  than	   the	   religion	   if	   Islam	   itself,	   mostly	   because	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   Western	  understanding	   of	   the	   political	   aspects	   of	   Islam.	   	   The	   existence	   of	   Islamic	  empires,	  particularly	  the	  Persian	  and	  Ottoman	  empire,	  mean	  that	  ideas	  about	  Islamic	   governance	  did	   exist	   prior	   to	   1883,	   but	   the	  Western	  world	   did	   not	  devote	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  study	  or	  literature	  to	  it.	  	  
                                                
4 International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism”, (Cairo/Brussels: 2005), 2 
5 Mehdi Mozafarri, “What is Islamism? History and a Definition of a Concept”, (Routledge: 
London 2007), 18 
 12 
	   Armstrong,	   a	   religious	   scholar	   at	   Oxford	   University,	   argues	   that	   the	  questioning	  of	  what	  a	  modern	  Muslim	  state	  was,	  and	  how	  religion	  played	  a	  role	  in	  such	  a	  state,	  stemmed	  from	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  West	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	   began	   in	   1750	   and	   has	   continued	   through	   today.	   Religious	   scholar	  Karen	   Armstrong	   states	   “…the	   West	   had	   found	   it	   necessary	   to	   separate	  religion	   and	   politics	   in	   order	   to	   free	   government,	   science	   and	   technology	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  conservative	  religion”6.	  However,	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world	  did	  not	  want	  a	  state	   in	  which	  religion	  was	  separate	   from	  state	   affairs,	   which	   lead	   many	   Muslims	   living	   under	   Imperial	   powers	   to	  question	  and	  assert	  the	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  governance.	  Armstrong	  also	  focuses	  on	   the	   importance	   of	   Islam	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   nationalism	   as	   a	   cause	   of	  Western	  influence,	  “The	  unity	  of	  the	  ummah	  had	  long	  been	  a	  treasured	  ideal;	  now	  the	  Muslim	  world	  was	  split	  into	  kingdoms	  and	  republics,	  whose	  borders	  were	  arbitrarily	  drawn	  up	  by	  Western	  powers”7.	  	  	   In	  much	   of	   the	   scholarship	   following	  World	  War	   II,	   one	   can	   see	   the	  emergence	  of	  intellectuals	  who	  call	  for	  a	  return	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  proof	  texts	  as	   a	   means	   of	   creating	   a	   society	   that	   would	   be	   true	   to	  Allah—which,	   in	   a	  Muslim	   context,	   means	   “…the	   creation	   of	   a	   just	   society	   in	   which	   the	  individual	   could	  more	   easily	  make	   that	   existential	   surrender	   to	   his	   or	   her	  
                                                
6 Karen Armstrong, “Islam: A Short History”, (New York: 2002), 126 
7 Ibid, 127 
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whole	  being	  that	  would	  bring	  fulfillment”8.	  As	  Armstrong	  illustrates,	  the	  need	  to	   re-­‐assert	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   proof	   texts	   in	   governance	   and	   in	   the	  
ummah	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  Western	  powers	  and	  Western	  ideas	  of	  secularism.	  Colonialism	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  do	  with	  this	  need.	  Following	  the	  World	   War	   II,	   many	   areas	   with	   primarily	   Arab	   populations	   pushed	   back	  against	  the	  colonial	  powers	  that	  governed	  much	  of	  the	  Arab	  world.	  Because	  colonial	  powers	  had	  been	  so	  involved	  in	  governance	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East,	  nationalism	  and	  a	  call	  to	  Islamic	  governance	  were	  very	  much	  reactions	  to	  this.	  	  	   As	   nationalist	   sentiment	   became	  more	   prominent	  within	   the	  Middle	  East,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   prominent	   scholars	   that	   become	   extremely	  important	  to	  groups	  advocating	  for	  a	  more	  Islamist	  approach	  to	  politics,	  and	  scholars	  who	  also	  become	  extremely	  important	  to	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  the	  Taliban,	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  Because	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  case	  studies,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  look	  at	  the	  developments	  of	  Muhammad	  ibn	  ‘Abdul	  Wahhab,	  Sayyid	  Qutb,	  and	  Abdul	  A’la	  Maududi.	  	  	   Muhammad	   ibn	   ‘Abdul	   Wahhab	   did	   not	   began	   writing	   about	   the	  importance	  of	   Islam	   in	  politics	  after	  World	  War	   I,	   but	  began	  scholarship	   in	  the	   nineteenth	   century,	   far	   before	   Islamist	   thought	   began	   to	   take	   root	   in	  political	   discourse.	   Wahhab	   is	   charged	   by	   many	   in	   the	   West	   as	   “…the	  
                                                
8 Ibid., 126 
 14 
legendary	   mastermind	   of	   a	   ‘pre-­‐modern,’	   ‘fundamentalist,’	   ‘puritanical,’	  ‘regressive,’	   ‘violent,’	  political	  movement	  and,	  concomitantly,	  the	  inspiration	  for	   present-­‐day	   militant	   Muslim	   sects	   in	   struggle	   against	   modernity” 9 .	  Wahhab	  was	  a	  moral	  critic	  primarily,	  and	  aimed	  to	  critique	  the	  practices	  of	  
islah	   and	   tajdid	   (critique	   and	   reform).	   Wahhab	   saw	   “..pervasive	   moral	  laxity…”10,	   and	   promoted	   the	   notion	   of	   tawhid,	   the	   absolute	   Unity	   of	   God,	  which	   promotes	   the	   idea	   that	   nothing	   can	   be	   compared	   to	   God.	   Wahhab	  denounced	  the	  use	  of	  taqlid	   (human	  reason)	   in	   interpreting	  the	  proof	  texts,	  and	   saw	   Allah	   as	   a	   transcendent	   being,	   rather	   than	   an	   imminent	   being.	  	  Seeing	   Allah	   as	   a	   transcendent	   being	   reflects	   the	   idea	   that	   human	   beings	  cannot	   hope	   to	   understand	   God,	   but	   rather,	   that	   one	   must	   follow	   his	  teachings	  to	  achieve	  eternal	  salvation.	  This	  notion	  is	  important	  for	  the	  study	  of	  Islamism	  because	  Islamist	  organizations	  will	   fall	  on	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  spectrum	   with	   regard	   to	   tawhid	   or	   taqlid—whether	   or	   not	   an	   individual	  should	  embrace	  the	  proof	  texts	  by	  accepting	  already	  existing	  understanding,	  or	  using	  one’s	  own	  reason.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  political	  ramifications,	  this	  supposes	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  community	   in	   which	   “…Muslims	   are	   bound	   to	   each	   other	   through	   a	   set	   of	  
                                                
9 Samira Haj, “Reordering Islamic Orthodoxy: Muhammad ibn ‘Abdul Wahhab”, (New 
York), 333 
10 Ibid., 337 
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authoritative	   texts	   and	   practices”11.	   	   Wahhab’s	   ideas	   and	   suggestions	   are	  important	   for	   future	  and	   ideological	  development	  of	  both	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  the	  Taliban.	  Wahhab	  also	  	  represents	  the	  ideological	  basis	  of	  jihadist	  thought	  in	  both	   of	   these	   organizations.	   In	   October	   of	   2001,	   the	   The	   New	   York	   Times	  stated	   “The	   faith	   that	   drives	   Osama	   bin	   Laden	   and	   his	   followers	   is	   a	  particularly	   austere	   and	   conservative	   brand	   of	   Islam	   known	   as	  Wahhabism…”12.	  	  Though	  Wahhab	  became	  important	  for	  later	  Islamist	  organizations,	  it	  is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   Wahhab’s	   ideas	   were	   not	   explicitly	   political	   in	  nature.	  Though	  his	  emphasis	  on	  tawhid	  implies	  many	  ideas	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	   the	  Muslim	  community	   should	  govern	   themselves,	  Wahhad	  does	  not	  explicitly	   suggest	   policy	   prescriptions	   for	   such	   governance.	   Rather,	   it	   is	  assessed	   in	   a	   religious	   sense.	   Wahhabi	   thought	   was	   used	   in	   political	  governance	  first	  by	  the	  al-­‐Saud	  family	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  as	  a	  means	  of	  uniting	  the	   more	   nomadic	   tribes	   throughout	   the	   Arabian	   peninsula,	   and	   was	   also	  used	   as	   a	   way	   to	   combat	   communism	   that	   threatened	   the	   al-­‐Saud	   family	  following	  World	  War	   II.13	  	   It	   is	   therefore	   an	   ideology	   that	   can	  be	  used	   as	   a	  vehicle	  for	  Islamist	  forms	  of	  governance.	  Thus,	  when	  one	  examines	  the	  ways	  
                                                
11 Ibid., 339 
12 Ibid., 333 
13 The Maghreb Center, “Political Islam”, 
http://themaghrebcenter.wordpress.com/hot-topics/political-islam/ 
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in	   which	   Al-­‐Qa’ida	   and	   other	   Islamist	   groups	   read	   Wahhab,	   one	   must	  understand	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  his	   ideas	   are	   represented	   in	  pure	   form,	   and	  how	  they	  are	  applied	  to	  Islamist	  thought.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  broader	  ummah	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  with	  Islam	  because	  of	  the	  role	  that	  Muhammad’s	   early	   governance	   of	   the	   community	   played	   in	   establishing	  Islam	  as	  a	  religion.	  The	  ummah,	  and	  its	  governance	  is	  mentioned	  throughout	  the	   Qur’an.	   Therefore,	   when	  Wahhab	   mentions	   the	   ummah,	   and	   discusses	  this	  in	  his	  writings,	  it	  does	  not	  make	  his	  ideas	  specifically	  Islamist	  in	  nature.	  	  Another	   important	   historical	   figure	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   term	  “Islamism”	  is	  Sayyid	  Qutb,	  an	  Egyptian	  ideologue	  who	  was	  the	  first	  figure	  to	  explicitly	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  developing	  the	  state	  and	  society.	  Qutb	  is	  generally	   credited	   with	   developing	   the	   philosophical	   basis	   of	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  and	  other	  organizations	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  Middle	  East.	  Qutb	  believed	  that	  the	  West	  had	  so	  permanently	  affected	  politics	  and	  society	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  particularly	  Egypt,	  that	  citizens	  of	  these	  countries	  were	  living	  in	  a	  state	  of	  jahiliyya-­‐meaning	  ignorance	  of	  the	  “’divine	  mandate’”14,	  or	  the	  time	  before	   Islamic	   enlightenment.	   Qutb’s	   philosophy	   on	   Islamism	   is	   also	   very	  different,	  and	  can	  be	   interpreted	  as	   the	   founding	  of	   Islamism	  because	  of	   its	  explicitly	   political	   nature.	   Qutb	   promotes	   the	   idea	   that	   alternatives	   to	   the	  
                                                
14 John Calvert, “Sayidd Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism”, (Columbia/Hurst: 
New York, 2010), 1 
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current	  administration	  should	  be	  searched	  for,	  and	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  live	  under	   Islam	   should	   vehemently	   resist	   that	   current	   administration,	   which	  ensured	   that	   Qutb	   became	   an	   extremely	   important	   figure	   in	   post-­‐colonial	  nationalist	   movements15.	   With	   Wahhab,	   references	   to	   Islam	   in	   politics	   is	  implicit,	   while	   Qutb	   is	   explicit	   with	   these	   references.	   This	   makes	   Qutb	  somewhat	  revolutionary	  in	  academic	  discourse	  on	  Islam.	  	  Qutb	   was	   a	   revolutionary	   reacting	   primarily	   to	   foreign	   influence	   in	  Egypt,	   and	   after	   independence,	   an	   administration	   that	   did	   not	   incorporate	  Islamic	  ideas	  into	  their	  governance	  enough	  for	  Qutb’s	  taste.	  Therefore,	  Qutb	  is	   particularly	   popular	   to	   Islamist	   groups	   that	   operate	   within	   individual	  states,	   and	   seek	   to	   undermine	   a	   specific	   regime.	   “…in	   the	   1970s,	   Marwan	  Hadid	  and	  his	  Syrian	  Muslim	  Brother	  colleagues	  drew	  upon	   the	  writings	  of	  Qutb	  in	  launching	  their	  jihad	  against	  the	  ‘Alawi-­‐dominated	  Ba’thist	  regime	  in	  Damascus”16.	  When	  discussing	  the	  idea	  of	  jihad,	  Qutb	  does	  so	  in	  reference	  to	  intrastate	  politics,	  rather	  than	  discussing	  a	  global	  jihad.	  	  Qutb	  is	  a	  pivotal	  figure	  for	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  Taliban	  in	  particular.	   Qutb’s	   teachings	   become	   extremely	   important	   to	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood,	   particularly	   in	   their	   later	   years,	   and	  Qutb	   continues	   to	   be	   an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  today.	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  
                                                
15 Ibid., 2 
16 Ibid., 4 
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ideological	   philosophy	   with	   regard	   to	   jihad	   also	   draws	   a	   great	   deal	   from	  Qutb.	   Though	   this	   is	   taken	   out	   of	   context	   by	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  remember	   that	   Qutb	   is	   the	   first	   Islamic	   scholar	   to	   view	   jihad	   as	   both	   an	  offensive	  and	  defensive	  mechanism.	  For	  Qutb,	  jihad	  can	  be	  offensive	  in	  very	  specific	   circumstances.	   Qutb	   claims,	   “If	   we	   insist	   on	   calling	   Islamic	   jihad	  a	  defensive	  movement,	  then	  we	  must	  change	  the	  word	  ‘defense’	  and	  mean	  by	  it	  the	   ‘defense	  of	  man’…”17.	   In	   this	  quote,	  Qutb	  demonstrates	   that	  he	  believes	  defense	   should	   not	   only	  mean	   immediate	   response	   to	   attack,	   but	   also	   to	   a	  response	   to	   attacks	   on	   the	   freedom	   of	   members	   of	   the	   islamiyyah	   (the	  Muslim	  community).	  These	  ideas	  will	  later	  be	  used	  by	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  in	  defense	  of	  attacks	  like	  the	  9/11	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Qutb’s	   reinterpretation	   of	   the	   term	   jahaliyya	   is	   extremely	   important	  to	  later	  developments	  of	  political	  Islam.	  Prior	  to	  intellectual	  development	  in	  political	  Islam,	   jahaliyya	  referred	  to	  the	  time	  of	   ignorance	  before	  Islam,	  and	  before	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   early	  ummah	   in	  Arabia.	   Qutb	   refers	   to	   this	  term	  in	  his	  writings	  on	  jihad,	  but	  instead	  morphs	  the	  term	  to	  refer	  not	  only	  to	  a	  time	  of	  ignorance	  before	  the	  knowledge	  of	  Allah,	  but	  also	  to	  secularism	  and	  modernity.	   Esposito	   states	   “Sayyid	   Qutb	   interpreted	   jahaliyyah	   as	   the	  domination	   of	   humans	   over	   humans,	   rather	   than	   submission	   of	   humans	   to	  
                                                
17 Sayyid Qutb, “War, Peace, and Islamic Jihad”, (New York: 2002), 224 
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God”18.	   As	   this	   paper	   will	   later	   explore	   through	   the	   case	   studies,	   militant	  Islamist	  groups,	  such	  as	  Al-­‐Qa’ida	  and	  the	  Taliban,	  and	  Islamist	  organizations	  that	  desire	  governance	  under	  divine	  law,	  like	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  often	  refer	  to	  this	  definition	  of	   jahaliyyah	   in	  defense	  of	  the	  need	  for	  a	  country,	  or	  world,	  ruled	  by	  Allah,	  and	  not	  by	  man.	  	  	  A	   third	  extremely	   important	  scholar,	  who	  wrote	  slightly	  earlier	   than	  Qutb	   and	   was	   an	   important	   ideological	   figure	   for	   many	   of	   Qutb’s	   ideas,	   is	  Abul	   A’la	   Maududi.	   Maududi	   focuses	   more	   on	   the	   global	   jihad	   than	   state-­‐specific	  jihad—ideas	  that	  will	  become	  integral	  in	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  jihad	  against	  the	  West.	  Maududi	  is	  extremely	  important	  in	  understanding	  modern	  day	  jihadist	  thought,	  and	  puts	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  focus	  into	  re-­‐defining	  the	  idea	  of	  jihad,	  and	  de-­‐bunking	   Western	   understandings	   of	   jihad.	   	   Maududi	   identified	   some	  common	   misconceptions	   that	   shape	   Western	   understandings	   of	   jihad.	   In	  Maududi’s	   eyes,	   Islam	   cannot	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   religion	   in	   the	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   sense.	   Maududi	   states	   “In	   common	   terminology	   ‘religion’	   means	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  hotch	  potch	  of	  some	  beliefs	  and,	  prayers,	  and	  rituals”19.	  Maududi	   sees	   this	  definition	  of	   religion	  as	   something	   that	  necessitates	   that	  religion	  be	  kept	  to	  the	  private	  sphere.	  However,	  Maududi	  understands	  Islam	  as	  a	  “revolutionary	  ideology	  and	  programme	  which	  seeks	  to	  alter	  the	  social	  
                                                
18 John L. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam”, (Oxford: 2003), 154 
19 Abul A’la Maududi, “Jihad in Islam”, (Lebanon: 1939), 4 
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order	   of	   the	   world	   and	   rebuild	   it	   in	   conformity	   with	   its	   own	   tenets	   and	  ideals.”20.	   This	   is	   key	   to	   understanding	   the	   broader	   philosophy	   of	   political	  Islam,	  but	  also	  highlights	  understandings	  in	  the	  Muslim	  community	  that	  have	  existed	  since	  the	  ummah	  of	  the	  Prophet.	  Maududi	  asserts	  this	  because	  of	  the	  Western	   world’s	   failure	   to	   understand	   these	   aspects	   of	   Islam	   lead	   to	  misunderstandings	   of	   its	   purpose.	   Particularly	   because	   Islam	   has	   the	  reference	  of	   the	  early	  ummah,	  Maududi	  sees	   the	  public	  sphere	  and	  political	  governance	   as	   an	   important	  part	   of	  perpetuating	   a	   community	  of	   believers	  on	   earth.	  Maududi	   states	   that	   he	  believes	   the	   closest	  English	   translation	   to	  
jihad	  would	  be	  “’to	  exert	  one’s	  utmost	  endeavor	  in	  promoting	  a	  cause’”21.	  In	  this	  way,	  Maududi	  is	  trying	  to	  criticize	  looking	  at	  Islam	  as	  a	  religion	  like	  other	  world	  religions,	  and	  rather	  proposes	  that	  Islam	  be	  looked	  at	  as	  a	  religion	  that	  permeates	  the	  fields	  of	  politics,	  social	  life,	  and	  international	  relations,	  and	  is,	  for	  him,	  not	  just	  a	  private	  matter.	  	  Maududi	   also	   touches	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   viewing	   Islam	   as	   a	  revolutionary	  ideology,	  rather	  than	  a	  religion	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense.	  This	  is	  a	   common	   theme	   that	   flows	   through	   all	   important	   scholarship	   in	   the	   post	  World	  War	  I	  and	  II	  phases	  of	  Islamist	  thought,	  and	  is	  also	  a	  persistent	  idea	  in	  21st	   century	   Islamist	   thought.	   One	   can	   see	   this	   question	   and	   idea	   raised	   a	  
                                                
20 Ibid., 5 
21 Ibid., 5 
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great	  deal	  in	  the	  present	  day	  with	  ideas	  of	  Islamist	  parties,	  particularly	  after	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  Organizations	  like	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Al	  Na’ada	   in	   Tunisia	   operate	   under	   similar	   beliefs,	   and	   therefore	   believe	   that	  Islam	   is	   important	   in	   all	   aspects	   of	   a	   society,	   including	   politics.	  Understanding	  Islam	  and	  political	   Islam	  outside	  of	  Western	  understandings	  of	  religious	  practice	  is	  crucial,	  and	  is	  also	  a	  prominent	  theme	  in	  the	  literature	  surrounding	   Islamism.	  One	  can	  see	   that	   the	  view	  of	   Islam	  as	  a	  religion	   that	  permeates	   the	  political	  and	  social	  realms	  of	  a	  society	  creates	  an	   idea	   in	   the	  Western	   imagination	   that	   displays	   Islam	   as	   intolerant	   in	   their	   approach	   to	  society.	   Particularly	   because	   in	   the	   Western	   mindset,	   religion	   and	   state	  operations	  must	  be	   separate,	   it	   is	  difficult	   for	   said	  mindset	   to	   see	  a	   society	  where	  these	  two	  things	  are	  combined.	  This	  leads	  to	  misunderstandings	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  many	  Islamist	  organizations.	  For	  example,	  Qutb	  sees	  
jihad	  as	  both	  an	  offensive	  and	  a	  defensive	  mechanism.	  For	  many	  Westerners,	  this	   is	   considered	   dangerous	   and	   narrow-­‐minded.	   However,	   as	   historical	  context	   suggests,	   such	   a	   statement	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   there	   should	   be	  constant	   attack	   on	   groups	   of	   people	   that	   are	   different	   from	   the	   Western	  world.	  Rather,	  if	  one	  understands	  this	  idea	  of	  jihad	  in	  the	  Islamic	  context,	  it	  is	  possible	   to	  see	  that	  such	  an	   idea	  of	   jihad	   relates	   to	   the	  historical	  context	   in	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which	  Muslim	  ideas	  were	  being	  violently	  oppressed,	  and	  the	  community	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  assert	  itself.	  	  
Literature	  Review	  Scholarship	   surrounding	   Islamism	   spans	   a	   wide	   array	   of	  interpretations	   of	   Islam	   as	   a	   tradition	   and	   a	   political	   ideology.	   Scholars	   of	  Islamism	  generally	  agree	  that	  Western	  notions	  of	  the	  term	  Islamism	  are	  both	  an	  oversimplification	  of	  the	  term,	  and,	  often,	  a	  complete	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	   purpose	   of	   Islamism.	   	   For	   this	   paper,	   it	  was	   important	   to	   examine	   key	  scholars	   in	   revisionist	   discourse	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   Islamism.	   This	   literature	  review	   supports	   the	   previously	   stated	   hypothesis	   through	   a	   critique	   of	  Western	  approaches	  to	  Islamist	  thought.	  	  Malise	  Ruthven,	  a	  religious	  scholar	  at	  Oxford,	  argues	  “Muslim	  writers	  and	   ideologists	   described	   as	   ‘fundamentalist’	   have	   all	   adopted	   some	  modernistic	   and	   allegorical	   interpretations	   of	   the	   Qur’an”22.	   Scholarship	  acknowledges	   the	   idea	   that	   fundamentalists	   cannot	   be	   viewed	   as	  fundamentalists	   simply	   because	   they	   wish	   to	   establish	   an	   Islamic	   state.	  Rather,	  Ruthven	  proposes	  that	  Islamism	  be	  understood	  as	  progressive	  within	  its	  own	  tradition.	  If	  one	  were	  to	  place	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  the	  Taliban,	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	   into	   the	   context	   of	   Ruthven,	   Ruthven	   would	   understand	   the	  
                                                
22 Ruthven, “Islam”, 18 
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change	   over	   time	   of	   these	   organizations	   as	   an	   indication	   of	   their	   own	  modernization	  and	  progression	  within	  the	  tradition.	  	  Samira	   Haj	   argues	   a	   similar	   point.	   She	   states,	   “I	   propose	   that	   we	  engage	   in	   a	   more	   subtle	   and	   nuanced	   discussion	   of	   different	   traditions,	  recognizing	   that	   Western	   liberal	   thought	   is…as	   much	   of	   a	   tradition	   as	   is	  Islamic	  thought”23.	  For	  Haj,	  Western	  liberal	  thought	  accompanies	  the	  notion	  that	  in	  order	  for	  something	  to	  be	  modern,	  it	  must	  be	  secular.	  Because	  of	  the	  way	   in	   which	   Western	   society	   has	   developed,	   and	   the	   emphasis	   on	  separation	   of	   church	   and	   state,	   imposing	   a	   Western	   liberal	   framework	   on	  Islamic	   thought	   ensures	   that	   all	   Islamist	   thought	   can	   be	   read	   as	  “fundamentalist”.	   For	   Haj,	   Islam	   does	   represent	   modernity,	   but	   does	   so	  within	   its	   own	   context,	   rather	   than	   within	   the	   context	   of	   Western	   liberal	  framework.	   Islam	   is	   highlighted	   as	   a	   “discursive	   tradition”24 ,	   one	   with	  constant	   re-­‐evaluation.	   Islamism	   lives	   within	   Haj’s	   argument,	   and	   changes	  with	  Islamism.	  	  Kurzman,	   another	   prominent	   scholar	   at	   Oxford,	   also	   discusses	   the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  viewing	  an	  Islamist	  organization	  as	  “fundamentalist”	  is	  a	  label	   that	  can	  be	  misleading.	  Earlier	  discussion	  of	  Qutb	  highlights	   this	   idea.	  Qutb	   is	   often	   thought	   of	   as	   the	   pioneer	   of	   fundamentalist	   Islamist	   thought,	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however,	  as	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  Qutb	  proves,	  he	  is	  actually	  quite	  progressive	  in	  the	   realms	   of	   Islam,	   and	   takes	   many	   traditional	   ideas	   further.	   Kurzman	  examines	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   in	   great	   depth,	   and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   can	   be	  considered	  a	  modern	  Islamist	  organization.	  	  With	   the	   many	   interactions	   that	   the	   Western	   world	   has	   had	   with	  Islamism,	  these	  definitions	  become	  much	  more	  blurred,	  and	  Islamism	  comes	  to	   contain	   many	   different	   revolutionary	   movements,	   political	   parties,	   and	  theories.	  As	  Kurzman	  argues,	   “Islamists,	   like	  almost	  all	  Muslims,	   regard	   the	  early	   years	   of	   Islam	   as	   the	   golden	   era,	   and	   they	   aspire	   to	   model	   their	  behavior	   after	   the	   Prophet	   Muhammad	   and	   his	   early	   followers…”25	  Thus,	  even	   as	   Islamism	  develops	   into	  modernity,	   it	   still,	   in	  most	   cases,	  wishes	   to	  emulate	   the	   early	   ummah—political	   community	   of	   the	   Prophet—in	   its	  political	  aims.	  	  	   Kurzman	   compares	   and	   contrasts	   Islamist	   groups	   that	   embrace	  modernity	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	   touches	  on	  all	   three	  case	  studies	   covered	   in	   this	   paper.	   Kurzman	   argues	   that	   Islamist	   groups	   who	  embrace	  modernity	  do	  more	  for	  their	  organization’s	  longevity.	  This	  contrasts	  traditionalist	   movements	   who,	   “…are	   finding	   it	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	  survive	   in	   a	   competitive	   religious	   environment	   and	   occupy	   only	   isolated	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pockets	   of	   Muslim	   society”26.	   He	   also	   argues	   that	   modern	   Islamists	   have	  extremely	   modern	   goals,	   rather	   than	   the	   archaic	   goals	   the	   West	   often	  interprets.	  	  “Islamist	   political	   platforms	   share	   significant	   planks	   with	  Western	  modernity.	  Islamists	  envision	  overturning	  tradition	  in	  politics,	   social	   relations,	   and…they	   favor	   egalitarian	  meritocracy,	  as	  opposed	  to	  inherited	  social	  hierarchies”27	  	  Kurzman	   sees	   the	   fundamental	   problem	  with	   Islamism	  moving	   forward	   as	  the	  ability	  to	  gain	  popular	  support.	  When	  Kurzman	  wrote	  in	  2002,	  Islamism	  had	   not	   gained	   the	   political	   support	   throughout	   the	   Middle	   East,	   most	  notably	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  in	  Egypt,	  that	  it	  has	  in	  the	  past	  year.	  Kurzman	  states	  “Islamists	  thus	  face	  a	  dilemma	  that	  is	  common	  to	  other	  radical	  movements	  of	  the	   past	   century:	  whether	   to	  water	   down	   their	  message	   to	   attract	   popular	  support	  or	  maintain	  a	  pure	  vision”28.	  With	  the	  increased	  support	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  now	  for	  Islamist	  groups,	  one	  must	  question	  which	  of	  these	  approaches	  Islamism	   has	   decided	   to	   take.	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   the	   automatic	  assumption	  that	  Kurzman	  makes	  in	  assessing	  Islamism	  as	  radical.	  This	  paper	  will	  not	   function	  under	  such	  an	  assumption,	  but	  will	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	  such	   an	   assumption	   is	   warranted.	   When	   Kurzman	   references	   radical	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organizations	   that	   “water	   down	   their	  message”29,	   he	   does	   not	   consider	   the	  possibility	   that	   some	   Islamist	   organizations	   may	   not	   have	   a	   need	   for	   this.	  This	   paper	   will	   show	   that	   there	   are	   many	   different	   ways	   that	   Islamism	  adapts	  itself	  to	  changing	  times	  in	  all	  of	  the	  case	  studies.	  	  Mark	  Lynch,	  meanwhile,	  highlights	   the	   fundamental	  challenge	  within	  Islamism	  regarding	  modernity,	  	  …the	   fierce	   war	   between	   the	   Salafi	   purists	   who	   call	   for	   a	  literalistic	   Islam	   insulated	   from	   modernity	   and	   the	  modernizing	   pragmatists	   who	   seek	   to	   adapt	   Islam	   to	   the	  modern	  world.30	  	  For	  Lynch,	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  that	  Islamism	  seeks	  to	  modernize	  itself,	  and	  embraces	   changing	   political	   and	   social	   climates.	   As	   this	   paper	   examines	  change	   over	   time,	   and	   the	   role	   such	   change	   plays	   in	   the	   ideological	  developments	   of	   Islamist	   organizations,	   it	  will	   become	   clear	   that	   there	   are	  many	   ways	   Islamist	   organizations	   embrace	   changing	   political	   and	   social	  times	  in	  their	  own	  way.	  	  	   Because	  of	  the	  many	  ways	  that	  the	  literature	  expresses	  the	  differences	  between	  different	  sects	  of	  Islam,	  and	  therefore	  different	  Islamist	  traditions,	  it	  can	   indeed	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   portrayal	   of	   Islamism	   in	   American	   media	  images	  is	  extremely	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  tradition.	  Because	  the	  literature	  highlights	  the	  problems	  with	  a	  Western	  analysis	  of	  Islam,	  and	  the	  ways	  that	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Islamism	   is	  constantly	  evolving	   in	   its	  own	  way,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  understand	  the	   gross	  misinterpretations	   that	   American	   understandings	   of	   the	   Islamist	  tradition	  support.	  	  
Case	  Study	  1:	  Al-­Qaeda	  	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   was	   chosen	   as	   the	   first	   case	   study	   because	   of	   its	   role	   in	  bringing	  Islamism	  into	  the	  American	  public	  eye.	  After	  the	  Twin	  Towers	  fell	  in	  2001,	  America	  was	  in	  complete	  uproar,	  and	  the	  public	  was	  bombarded	  with	  images	   of	   burning	   buildings,	   and	   tapes	   of	   Osama	   bin	   Laden	   expressing	   his	  disdain	   for	   American	   foreign	   politices.	   Examining	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   without	   these	  pre-­‐conceived	   ideas	   is	   difficult	   for	   many	   prominent	   intellectuals	   in	   the	  United	   States,	   another	   reason	   that	   choosing	   to	   examine	   ideological	   change	  over	  time	  removes	  one	  from	  these	  pre-­‐conceived	  notions.	  	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   is	   very	  much	   a	   product	   of	   its	   time	   period,	   a	  multinational	  organization	   that	   has	   become	   increasingly	   globalized	   over	   time.	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  Islamist	   vision	   is	   not	   tied	   to	   one	   country,	   but	   rather,	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   has	   policy	  prescriptions	  for	  the	  Muslim	  world	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  is	  very	  linked	  to	  the	  idea	  of	   the	   ummah,	   and	   a	   single	   Arab	   community	   that	   must	   follow	   similar	  practices	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  proof	  texts.	  	  	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   was	   a	   product	   of	   the	   jihad	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   during	   the	  Soviet	  occupation	  of	  1979-­‐89.	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  and	  Ayman	  al-­‐Zawahiri,	  the	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primary	   founders	   of	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	   were	   both	   in	   Afghanistan	   assisting	   the	  
mujahideen	  against	  invading	  Soviet	  forces.	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  recruited	  men	  to	  the	  cause	   in	  Afghanistan	  by	   recruiting	  young	  Arabs.	  As	  Lawrence	  Wright,	   a	  journalist	  and	  scholar	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  examines	  the	  reasons	  for	  young	  Arabs	  to	  turn	  to	  martyrdom,	  he	  examines	  the	  political	  and	  social	  situations	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	   “The	   lure	   of	   an	   illustrious	   and	   meaningful	   death	   was	   especially	  powerful	   in	  cases	  where	  the	  pleasures	  and	  rewards	  of	   life	  were	  crushed	  by	  government	   oppression	   and	   economic	   deprivation” 31 .	   The	   jihad	   in	  Afghanistan	   presented	   Arabs	   and	   Afghans	   alike	  with	   a	   unifying	   cause,	   and	  charismatic	  figures	  like	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  drew	  upon	  the	  depravity	  of	  young	  Arabs	   to	   glorify	   the	   idea	   of	  martyrdom.	   “Martyrdom	   promised	   such	   young	  men	  an	  ideal	  alternative	  to	  a	  life	  that	  was	  so	  sparing	  in	  its	  rewards”32.	  Arabs	  rallied	   around	   the	   cause	   of	   expelling	   “…the	   infidel	   invader	   from	   a	   Muslim	  land” 33 .	   It	   was	   within	   this	   political	   context	   that	   the	   multinational	  organization	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   came	   to	  be.	  On	   this	  basis,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  was	   also	   able	   to	  establish	  itself	  as	  one	  of	  the	  few	  Islamist	  organizations	  of	   its	  time	  to	  have	  a	  truly	  global	  perspective	  on	  jihad.	  This	  served	  them	  in	  drawing	  followers,	  and	  also	  disseminating	  their	  message.	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   Though	   Zawahiri	   and	   bin	   Laden	   came	   from	   very	   different	   political	  goals	  and	  objectives	  in	  the	  jihad	  in	  Afghanistan,	  they	  also	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  in	  common	   when	   they	   came	   together	   to	   found	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   in	   1988.	   Both	   men	  were	   educated,	   “members	   of	   the	   educated	   and	   technological	   class,	   despite	  their	   fundamentalist	   religious	   views”34.	   As	   Fawaz	   A.	   Gerges,	   a	   professor	   of	  Middle	  Eastern	  Studies	  and	  International	  Relations	  and	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics,	  describes,	  “Al-­‐Qaeda	  was	  born	  out	  of	  a	  marriage	  of	  convenience	  between	  Zawahiri	   and	  powerful	  Egyptian	   contingent	  on	   the	  one	  hand…and	  bin	  Laden…on	  the	  other”35.	  The	  profound	  influence	  of	  both	  Zawahiri	  and	  bin	  Laden	   represents	   the	   influence	   of	   two	   prominent	   intellectual	   traditions	   on	  Al-­‐Qaeda.	   “Egyptian	   radical	   Islamism	   and	   Saudi	   ultra-­‐conservatism.”36	  This	  highlights	   the	   breadth	   of	   religious	   influence	   that	   one	   can	   find	   even	  within	  Islam.	   The	   two	   different	   ideological	   traditions	   of	   Zawahiri	   and	   bin	   Laden	  combined	   to	   create	   an	   organization	   with	   an	   ideology	   very	   different	   from	  many	   other	   Islamist	   organizations.	   To	   bring	   this	   point	   back	   to	   the	   central	  question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   Islamism	   can	   be	   contained	   inside	   one	   single	  definition,	   the	   intellectual	   traditions	   of	   Zawahiri	   and	   bin	   Laden	   further	  highlight	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  single	  categorization.	  	  	   For	  Zawahiri,	  secular	  nationalism	  in	  Egypt	  fueled	  much	  of	  the	  doctor’s	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36 Ibid., 34 
 30 
interest	   in	   the	   Afghan	   jihad.	   For	   Zawahiri,	   “…only	   Qur’anic-­‐based	   states	  would	   protect	   and	   promote	   Islam	   against	   the	  West’s	   corrupting	   influences	  and	   imperial	   crusades”37.	   In	   the	   days	   prior	   to	   his	   alliance	   with	   bin	   Laden,	  Zawahiri	  had	  very	   little	   interest	   in	  pursuing	   transnational	   jihad,	   and	  rather	  focused	   on	   the	   problems	  within	   the	   Egyptian	  world.	   Zawahiri’s	   ideological	  roots	   were	   steeped	   in	   the	   ideas	   and	   teaching	   of	   Sayyid	   Qutb.	   Zawahiri	  “…sought	   to	   bring	   Qutb’s	   unfinished	   struggle	   to	   fruition	   and	   establish	   a	  Qur’anic-­‐based	  state”38.	  He	  began	  pursuing	  this	  cause	  in	  Egypt	  as	  a	  teenager,	  first	   developing	   an	   underground	   movement	   in	   Egypt	   against	   Nasser,	   and	  attempted	  to	  stage	  a	  military	  coup	  to	  facilitate	  change	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  state.	  Prior	  to	  his	  decision	  to	  embrace	  transnational	  jihad,	  Zawahiri	  was	  focused	  on	  overthrowing	  the	  secular	   leadership	   in	  Egypt,	  convinced	  of	   the	  detriment	   it	  posed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   “proper”	   Islamic	   state.	   For	   Zawahiri,	  Afghanistan	  was	  a	   trial	   in	  assessing	   the	  possibility	  of	  developing	  an	   Islamic	  state	  in	  Egypt.	  	  	  	   Bin	   Laden’s	   intellectual	   focus	   was	   very	   different	   than	   Zawahiri’s.	  Though	  bin	  Laden	  also	  drew	  much	  of	  his	  political	  base	  from	  the	  teachings	  of	  Qutb,	   the	   most	   influential	   figure	   in	   his	   intellectual	   development	   prior	   to	  meeting	   Zawahiri	   was	   a	   lecturer	   at	   King	   Abdul	   Aziz	   University,	   Abdullah	  
                                                
37 Ibid., 35 
38 Ibid., 37 
 31 
Azzam.	  Azzam,	  like	  Qutb,	  “…favored	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  ‘pioneering	  vanguard’	  that	  would	  build	  an	  ideal	  Qur’anic	  society	  and	  bring	  about	  an	  Islamic	  revival	  worldwide.”39.	   Azzam	   also	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   “…a	   homeland,	   as	   a	  base	  for	  Islam…”40.	  One	  can	  see	  bin	  Laden	  internalize	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  in	  his	  quest	  for	  an	  Islamic	  state	  in	  Afghanistan.	  Azzam,	  like	  Qutb,	  did	  not	  wish	  for	  an	  international	  jihad,	  and	  rather,	  focused	  on	  the	  development	  of	  a	  solid	  base	   that	   would	   promote	   further	   development	   of	   a	   worldwide	   Islamic	  community.	  Bin	  Laden	  also	  believed	  in	  transnational	  Muslim	  community	  that	  could	  be	  free	  from	  the	  segregation	  of	  Muslims	  by	  sect	  or	  nationality.	  	  	   Here,	  one	  can	  see	  differences	  between	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  both	  the	  Taliban,	  born	   after	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   and	   the	  much	   older	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	   Because	   the	  latter	   organizations	   are	   so	   focused	   around	   their	   own	   countries	   and	  establishing	   Islamic	   rule	   in	   their	   individual	   countries,	   they	   do	   not	   focus	   as	  much	   as	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   does	   on	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   homeland	   and	   base	   for	  Islam.	  For	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  global	  vision	  of	   Islam,	   there	  must	  be	  one	  central	  base	  that	  governs	  the	  entire	  Islamic	  community.	  In	  contrast,	  both	  the	  Taliban	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  believe	   that	   establishing	  more	   just	   Islamic	   rule	   in	  their	  individual	  countries	  is	  a	  more	  important	  focus.	  	  	   An	   important	   intellectual	  staple	  of	  present	  day	  Al-­‐Qaeda	   is	  hatred	  of	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the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  broader	  West.	  Though	  this	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  political	  aims	  today,	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case,	  particularly	  immediately	   after	   the	   founding	   of	   the	   organization,	   though	   it	   was	   already	  globalist	   in	   scope.	  As	  Gerges	   specifies,	   even	  when	   the	  Afghan	  war	  ended	   in	  1989,	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   rhetoric	   still	   did	   not	   focus	   on	   targeting	   the	  United	   States.	  This	  was	  partially	  due	  to	  US	  involvement	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  because	  much	  of	   the	  efforts	  of	  bin	  Laden’s	  recruits	  were	   funded	  through	  the	  United	  States.	   Gerges	   traces	   the	   development	   of	   anti-­‐American	   sentiment	   to	   the	  1990-­‐91	  Gulf	  War.	  During	  the	  Gulf	  War,	  the	  United	  States	  positioned	  troops	  in	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   bin	   Laden’s	   home	   country.	   “He	   viewed	   actions	   in	   the	   Gulf	  War	   and	   afterward	   as	  part	   of	   an	  American	   conspiracy	   to	   establish	  military	  bases	  and	  dominate	  Muslim	  lands…”41.	  	  	   Both	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   and	   the	   Taliban	   take	   a	   similar	  approach,	  and	  both	  do	  so	  because	  of	  their	  relationship	  with	  Western	  powers	  in	   their	   own	   countries.	   As	   is	   later	   discussed,	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   is	  compelled	   to	  establish	  a	  more	   international	  political	   ideology	  as	  a	   result	  of	  the	   problems	   in	   Palestine	   during	   the	   40’s.	   The	   Taliban	   wishes	   to	   rid	  Afghanistan	  of	  all	  external	  powers,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  United	  States	  now.	  In	  both	  cases,	  these	  aims	  are	  reactionary,	  and	  respond	  to	  foreign	  influence	  in	  the	   Islamic	  world.	  Because	   the	  Western	  world	   is	   constantly	   involved	   in	   the	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affairs	  of	  predominantly	  Islamic	  countries,	  hatred	  of	  the	  West	  is	  a	  prevalent	  theme	  in	  Islamist	  organizations.	  	  	   In	   a	   letter	   written	   to	   the	   Americans	   in	   2002,	   Osama	   bin	   Laden	  explains	  his	  hatred	   towards	   the	  United	  States,	   and	   reasons	   for	   the	  ongoing	  fight	   against	   them.	  He	  argues	   that	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  opposes	  and	   continues	   to	   fight	  America	   because	   “…you	   attacked	   us	   and	   continue	   to	   attack	   us”42.	   In	   this	  accusation,	   bin	   Laden	   focuses	   a	   great	   deal	   on	   US	   support	   for	   Israel,	   and	  against	   the	   Palestinian	   cause.	   “The	   blood	   pouring	   out	   of	   Palestine	  must	   be	  equally	  avenged.	  You	  must	  know	  that	   the	  Palestinians	  do	  not	  cry	  alone…”43	  He	   also	   states,	   “You	   attacked	   us	   in	   Somalia;	   you	   supported	   the	   Russian	  atrocities	   against	   us	   in	   Chechnya,	   the	   Indian	   oppression	   against	   us	   in	  Kashmir…”44	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  when	  bin	  Laden	  says	  “we”,	  he	  is	   referring	   to	   the	   Islamic	   ummah	   in	   general,	   and	   it	   is	   part	   of	   bin	   Laden’s	  agenda	  to	  establish	  his	  legitimacy.	  He	  hopes	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  speaking	  on	  behalf	   of	   the	   entire	   ummah,	   but,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   he	  represents	   only	   part	   of	   the	   ummah	   in	   these	   claims.	   Bin	   Laden	   goes	   on	   to	  specify	  what	  he	  believes	  the	  ummah	  should	  desire	  from	  the	  United	  States	  to	  right	  the	  perceived	  wrongs	  against	  the	  ummah.	  “Do	  not	  expect	  anything	  from	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us	   except	   jihad,	   resistance,	   and	   revenge”45.	   For	   bin	   Laden,	   such	   retribution	  stems	   from	   repeated	   US	   attacks	   on	   the	   ummah.	   “It	   is	   commanded	   by	   our	  religion	   and	   intellect	   that	   the	   oppressed	   have	   a	   right	   to	   return	   the	  aggression.”46	  Bin	  Laden	  therefore	  sees	  Palestinian	  acts	  of	  violence	  and	  acts	  of	  violence	  throughout	  the	  Muslim	  community	  as	  justification	  for	  aggression	  towards	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   United	   States	   is	   a	   symbol	   of	   the	  West,	   and	  even	   disdain	   for	   other	   Western	   powers,	   such	   as	   Israeli	   occupation	   of	  Palestine,	  are	  still	  equated	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Bin	  Laden	  justifies	  attacks	  against	  civilians,	  such	  as	  the	  9/11,	  by	  arguing	  that,	  “The	  American	  people	  are	  the	   ones	   who	   choose	   their	   government	   by	   way	   of	   their	   own	   free	   will	  [through	  democratic	  elections].47”	  Therefore,	  bin	  Laden	  believes	  all	   citizens	  of	  the	  United	  States	  should	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  Presidents	  offenses	  because	  of	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  democratic	  system.	  	  	   This	   is	   somewhat	   different	   than	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  Taliban	  view	  Westerners	  and	  the	  Western	  democratic	  system	  in	  general.	  Today,	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  embraces	  the	  democratic	  system,	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  animosity	  towards	  democracy	  that	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  demonstrates.	  The	  Taliban	  exhibits	  a	  similar	  disdain	  towards	  Westerners,	  and	  showed	  they	  felt	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  were	  somewhat	  justified	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in	  their	  harboring	  of	  Osama	  bin	  Laden.	  Though	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  Taliban	  display	  disdain	  towards	  the	  way	  of	   life	  of	  many	  Westerners,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  is	  unique	  in	  their	  desire	  to	  seek	  out	  this	  way	  of	  life	  and	  systematically	  attack	  it.	  	  	   Though	  attacks	  on	  the	  West	  began	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  jalahiliyya	  Sayyid	  Qutb	   first	   outlines,	   attacks	   on	   the	  United	   States,	   and	   an	   international	   jihad	  are	  staple	  intellectual	  aims	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  rather	  than	  any	  intellectual	  founder	  of	   political	   Islam.	   “While	   Qutb’s	   diatribe	   against	   America	   has	   widely	  resonated	   among	   Islamists,	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   actions	   cannot	   be	   traced	   to	   his	  rhetoric”48	  Western	   involvement	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   Middle	   East	   sparks	  both	  bin	  Laden	  and	  Zawahiri	  to	  specifically	  target	  the	  United	  States	  in	  their	  international	  jihadist	  aims.	  	  	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	  unlike	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  does	  not	  see	  democracy	  as	  a	   way	   to	   promote	   an	   Islamic	   state.	   In	   Zawahiri’s	   book	   Bitter	   Harvest:	   The	  
[Muslim]	  Brotherhood	  in	  Sixty	  Years,	  he	  argues	  that,	   “…democracy	  and	  Islam	  are	   antithetical	   and	   thus	   can	   never	   coexist”49.	   In	   the	   eyes	   of	   Zawahiri,	   the	  “true	   cause	   of	   Islam…is,	   enforcing	   Allah’s	   rule	   here	   on	   earth	   by	   any	   direct	  means,	  preferably	   jihad,	   not	  passive	   roundabout	  ways,	   such	  as	   elections”50.	  	  Zawahiri	   goes	  on	   to	   state	   “The	   legislator	   in	  democracies	   is	   the	  people,	   and	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the	  Legislator	  in	  monotheocracies	  is	  Allah,	  the	  Glorious	  and	  Most	  High.	  Thus,	  democracy	  is	  a	  partnership	  with	  Allah”51.	  Zawahiri	   is	  therefore	  arguing	  that	  because	  democracy	  puts	  the	  right	  to	  govern	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  people,	  rather	  than	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   God	   and	   Sharia’,	   it	   is	   considered	   blasphemous.	   The	  Taliban	  also	  does	  not	  embrace	  democracy	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	   does,	   but	   rather,	   promotes	   a	   more	   tribal	   approach	   to	  leadership.	   This	   is	   largely	   influenced	   by	   their	   tribal	   experiences	   in	  Afghanistan.	  	  	   If	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   rejects	   democracy,	   one	  must	   question	   the	   kind	   of	  world	  system	   that	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   envisions,	   and	   what	   kind	   of	   governance	   they	   do	  propose.	   In	   his	   attack	   of	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood’s	   desire	   for	   secular	  democracy	   in	   Egypt,	   Zawahiri	   demonstrates	   that	   he	   advocates	   for	   a	  “monotheocracy”52.	  Zawahiri	  argues	  “The	  difference	  between	  democracy	  and	  monotheocracy	   (tawhid)	   is	   that	   monotheocracy	   makes	   Allah	   the	   sole	  legislator	  while	  democracy	  is	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  people…”53.	  Therefore,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  promotes	  monotheocracy,	   and	   a	  world	   system	   in	  which	  Allah	   is	   trusted	   as	  the	   primary	   legislator.	   This	   therefore	   goes	   to	   show	   that	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   believes	  Islamic	   law	   is	  an	   important	  part	  of	  governance.	   “The	  Book	   [Koran]	  and	   the	  
sunna,	  and	  the	  sayings	  of	  the	  ulema…all	  clearly	  demonstrate	  that	  exchanging	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the	   Islamic	   sharia	   with	   something	   else	   is	   infidelity”54.	   Therefore,	   Al-­‐Qaeda	  also	  promotes	  the	  use	  of	  sharia	  in	  governance,	  rather	  than	  any	  other	  form	  of	  legislation.	  	  	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note,	   however,	   the	   approach	   to	   family	   life	   and	  women	  that	  many	  members	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  take.	  After	  the	  initial	  founding	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	   when	   bin	   Laden	   resided	   in	   the	   Sudan	   in	   the	   years	   1993-­‐5,	   it	   is	  interesting	  to	  examine	  the	  lives	  of	  his	  wives.	  Bin	  Laden	  supported	  his	  wives’	  continued	   career	   ambitions.	  His	  wife	  Umm	  Hamza	   remained	  a	  professor	  of	  child	   psychology,	   and	   another	   of	   his	   wives,	   Umm	   Khaled,	   taught	   Arabic	  grammar.	   Both	   women	   were	   able	   to	   continue	   their	   jobs	   by	   commuting	   to	  Saudi	   Arabia	   during	   bin	   Laden’s	   stay	   in	   Sudan.	   This	   highlights	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   is	   extremely	   modern,	   while	   also	   retaining	   ideals	   of	  fundamental	   Islam,	   and	   further	   demonstrates	   the	   idea	   that	   political	   Islam	  represents	  modernity	  within	  the	  tradition	  of	  Islam	  itself.	  	  	   What	   is	  particularly	   important	  about	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  when	  assessing	   them	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  Islamist	  movements	  is	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  this	  as	  a	   transnational	   movement,	   and	   montheocratic	   governance	   on	   an	  international	   scale.	   Though	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   founding	   grew	   from	   the	   war	   in	  Afghanistan,	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  organization	  have	  always	  been	  geared	  towards	  an	  international	  solution	  to	  governance.	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  rhetoric	  never	  focuses	  on	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the	   system	   in	   a	   single	   country,	   and	   only	   does	   so	   when	   criticizing	   foreign	  policy	   decisions	   of	   other	   countries—for	   example,	   the	   earlier	   critique	   of	   US	  action	  in	  Palestine.	  	  	   International	   jihad	   lies	   at	   the	   core	   of	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   intellectual	   and	  political	  aims.	  This	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  world	  view,	  and	  is	  something	  that	   follows	   the	   organization	   from	   its	   beginning	   to	   present	   day.	   	   For	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	  the	  ummah	  must	  constantly	  be	  striving	  to	  right	  all	  wrongs	  against	  the	  previously	   outlined	   monotheocracy.	   “Thus,	   we	   wrote	   these	   pages	   as	   a	  caution	   and	   warning	   to	   our	   Muslim	   umma	   in	   its	   sacred	   awakening	   and	  victorious	   jihad…to	   vanquish	   the	   American-­‐Jewish	   Crusading	   campaign”55.	  This	   call	   for	   the	  Muslim	   community	   to	   seek	   out	   governance	   that	   does	   not	  take	  Allah	   into	  account	  shows	   that	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  makes	   jihad	  a	  priority	   in	   their	  political	  aims.	  	  	   When	   one	   examines	   these	   views	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   recent	   Arab	  Awakening,	   or	   alongside	   the	   Western	   view	   of	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   mission,	   the	  aforementioned	   ideas	   are	   important.	  One	   could	   even	   argue	   statements	   like	  the	   previous	   are	   aimed	   specifically	   at	   Western	   countries.	   When	  understanding	   these	   views	   in	   the	   Western	   context,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  understand	   the	   lack	  of	  division	  between	  politics	  and	  religion	   in	   the	  Muslim	  mindset.	  For	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  and	  many	  other	  Islamist	  organizations,	  it	  is	  important	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for	  their	  own	  eternal	  salvation,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  ummah	  to	  ensure	  that	  Allah’s	  community	  on	  earth	  is	  as	  much	  to	  his	  liking	  as	  possible.	  	  	   However,	   in	   discussing	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   political	   aims,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  remember	   the	   different	   organizations	   and	   ideological	   Islamist	   traditions	  encompasses.	   From	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   inception	   to	   present	   day,	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   has	  brought	  a	  number	  of	  organizations	  under	  its	  wing	  that	  don’t	  necessarily	  align	  perfectly	  with	  their	  own	  political	  and	  ideological	  aims.	  Wright	  explains	  that	  after	  Al-­‐Qaeda’s	  inception,	  “bin	  Laden	  lured	  various	  nationalist	  groups	  under	  his	  umbrella	  by	  offering	  weapons	  and	  training…Bin	  Laden	  also	  provided	  seed	  money	  for	  revolution”56.	  Wright	  also	  states	  “…in	  the	  early	  nineties,	  bin	  Laden	  was	   still	   refining	   the	   concept	   of	   al-­‐Qaeda.	   It	   was	   only	   one	   of	   his	   many	  enterprises,	  but	  it	  offered	  him	  a	  potentially	  extraordinary	  base	  of	  power”57.	  	  	   This	  quote,	  and	  description	  of	  al-­‐Qaeda	  as	  an	  enterprise	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  the	  many	  modern	  aspects	  of	  al-­‐Qaeda	  as	  an	  Islamist	  organization.	  Affiliations	   with	   other	   organizations,	   and	   decisions	   to	   support	   certain	  regimes	   and	   revolutions	   through	   the	  Arab	  world	   are	  made,	   it	  would	   seem,	  based	  on	  opportunities	   to	  expand	  both	   the	  power	  and	  scope	  of	  al-­‐Qaeda	  as	  an	  organization.	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  has	  attempted	  to	  acknowledge	  its	  own	  mistakes	  in	  recent	  years,	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  ensure	   that	   its	  support	  continues	  and	  grows.	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Zawahiri	  states	  in	  2008	  “I	  neither	  condone	  the	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people	  nor	  claim	   that	   jihad	   is	   free	   of	   error.	   Muslim	   leaders	   during	   the	   time	   of	   the	  Prophet	  made	  mistakes,	  but	  the	  jihad	  goes	  on…”58.	  	  	   As	   al-­‐Qaeda’s	   supporters	   become	   more	   diverse,	   al-­‐Qaeda	   begins	   to	  face	  problems	   in	  establishing	  a	   cohesive	   Islamist	   vision,	   and	   its	   intellectual	  aims	   become	   extremely	   fractured.	   Gerges	   argues	   in	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Al-­
Qaeda	   that	   the	   organization	   is	   in	   a	   state	   of	   decline.	   This	   supposes	   that	   the	  primary	   goal	   of	   al-­‐Qaeda	   was	   to	   develop	   a	   cohesive	   support	   base	   under	  similar	   ideological	   ideas.	   However,	   it	   could	   also	   be	   argued	   that	   al-­‐Qaeda’s	  goal	  was	  rather	  to	  expand	  its	  own	  power	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world.	  Though	  after	  their	   stay	   in	   Afghanistan,	   this	   power	   began	   to	   decline,	   attempted	  involvement	  in	  the	  revolts	  in	  Syria	  and	  Libya	  could	  expand	  the	  power	  that	  al-­‐Qaeda	  has	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
Case	  Study	  2:	  The	  Taliban	  	  This	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  second	  case	  study	  because	  of	   its	  relationship	  to	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  and	  the	  media	  attention	  it	  received	  after	  the	  2001	  invasion.	  This	  case	  study	  will	  examine	  the	  Islamist	  policies	  of	  the	  Taliban	  from	  its	  inception	  and	   governance	   in	   Afghanistan,	   and	   then	   examine	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   their	  Islamist	   policies	   change	   following	   their	   defeat	   in	   2001.	   	   The	   histories	  surrounding	   both	   of	   these	   times	   shapes	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  
                                                
58 Gerges, “The Rise and Fall of al-Qaeda”, 123 
 41 
Taliban’s	   ideology.	  When	   the	  Taliban	   is	   discussed	   in	   the	  modern	  American	  media,	   they	   are	   often	   portrayed	   as	   parochial,	   and	   unwilling	   to	   embrace	  modernity.	  What	  this	  case	  study	  will	  show,	  particularly	  when	  one	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  Taliban’s	  change	  following	  2001,	  is	  the	  ways	  the	  movement	  has	  adapted	   to	  more	  modern	   times,	   and	   been	   able	   to	   change	   to	   accommodate	  such	  times.	  	  	   It	  is	  imperative	  to	  look	  at	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  Taliban	  in	  Kandahar	  in	  1994	   during	   the	   mujahedeen	   era.	   During	   this	   chaotic	   political	   time	   in	  Afghanistan,	   the	   Taliban	   emerges	   as	   an	   extremely	   popular	   grassroots	  movement.	  This	  case	  study	  assesses	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  became	  popular	  to	   the	   public	   through	   their	   appeal	   to	   religious	   governance,	   and	   the	   notion	  that	  they	  were	  a	  “movement	  for	  cleansing	  society	  rather	  than	  a	  party	  trying	  to	   grab	   power”59.	   It	   then	   focuses	   on	   the	   religious	   politics	   of	   the	   Taliban	  during	  their	  occupation	  of	  Kabul.	  Finally,	  this	  case	  study	  examines	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  2001	  US	  invasion,	  and	  subsequent	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Taliban,	  and	  how	   the	   new	   Taliban	   insurgency	   uses	   religious	   rhetoric	   for	   political	   gain.	  These	   different	   time	   periods	   will	   highlight	   the	   ideological	   changes	   the	  Taliban	  has	  undergone.	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   The	  Taliban	  first	  entered	  the	  Afghan	  political	  scene	  in	  1994,	  and	  they	  did	  so	  from	  Kandahar.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Taliban	  were	  students	  in	  Pakistan	  and	   Southern	   Afghanistan,	   at	   religious	   schools,	   or	   madrassas.	   Taliban	   is	  derived	   from	  Talib,	  which	  means	  student.	   In	   the	  madrasses,	   they	  received	  a	  strict	   religious	   education.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   they	  were	   also	   exposed	   to	   the	  chaotic	   political	   climate	   of	   the	   Mujahadeen	   era	   in	   Afghanistan.	   In	   the	  
madrassas,	  the	  young	  men	  who	  would	  become	  the	  Taliban	  learned	  about	  the	  original	  Islamic	  ummah,	  and	  came	  to	  believe	  that	  such	  religious	  order	  should	  be	   established	   in	   Afghanistan	   because	   of	   the	   chaos	   that	   enveloped	   the	  country	  then.	  The	  young	  men	  that	  would	  become	  the	  Taliban	  studying	  in	  the	  madrasas	  in	  Pakistan	  were	  closely	  tied	  to	  Pakistani	  political	  parties,	  and	  the	  mix	   between	   religious	   learning	   and	   the	   political	   ties	   established	   with	  Pakistani	  political	  parties	  breeds	  the	  views	  of	  political	  Islam	  that	  the	  Taliban	  mold	  with	  relation	  to	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  Afghanistan.	  Initially,	  their	  goal	  was	   somewhat	   simple:	   “ending	   the	   disorder	   while	   also	   reforming	  Afghanistan’s	  religious	  and	  cultural	  practices	  by	  creating	  a	  pure	  Islamic	  state	  along	   Salafist	   lines” 60 .	   “Restoring”	   a	   pure	   Islamic	   state	   is	   particularly	  important	   to	   the	   Taliban,	   and	   resonated	   with	   the	   people	   of	   Afghanistan	  because	  of	   the	   lack	  of	   religion	  under	  communist	  governance.	  Much	  of	   their	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funding	   and	   support	   came	   from	   Pakistan,	   and	   therefore,	   Pakistani	   officials	  also	   controlled	  much	   of	   the	   Taliban’s	   political	  message	   in	   the	   early	   stages.	  Rashid	   argues	   “Formal	   communications	   to	   foreign	   embassies	   in	   Islamabad	  were	  frequently	  dictated	  by	  Pakistani	  advisors”61.	  	  	   In	   de-­‐bunking	   common	   media	   images	   of	   the	   Taliban,	   the	  understanding	   that	   the	   Taliban	   was	   comprised	   of	   mainly	   young	   students	  starkly	   contrasts	   the	   general	   understanding	   most	   Americans	   have	   of	   the	  Taliban.	   As	   discussed	   previously,	   the	   organization’s	   name	   is	   based	   on	   the	  importance	   of	   students	   to	   the	  movement.	  When	  discussing	   common	  media	  images	  of	   the	  Taliban,	   this	  view	  is	  particularly	   interesting	  because	  so	  often,	  the	  American	  media	  portrays	   important	  Taliban	  officials	  as	  parochial,	  older	  individuals.	   One	   can	   also	   draw	   comparisons	   here	   to	   Al-­‐Qaeda.	   Young	  men	  were	  important	  to	  the	  mission	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  because,	  for	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  young	  men	  offered	  the	  most	  promising	  prospects	  for	  martyrdom.	  In	  1998,	  it	  was	  written	  “After	   age	   twenty-­‐five…	   people	   enter	   into	   family	   commitments;	   they	  graduate	   from	  college	  and	  commit	   themselves	   to	  work,	   in	  order	   to	  support	  their	  wives	   and	   children”62.	   Though	   Taliban	   officials	   never	   explicitly	   argue	  similar	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  young	  men,	  young	  men	  provided	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Taliban’s	   support	   and	   army	   in	   their	   early	   stages.	   This,	   again,	   demonstrates	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ways	   that	   Islamism	   is	   incorrectly	   represented	   in	   common	   media	   images.	  Very	  rarely	  are	  young	  men	  the	  face	  of	  Islamism	  to	  the	  American,	  or	  any	  other	  Western	  public.	  	  The	   links	   between	   the	   madrassas	   and	   the	   Taliban’s	   inception,	   the	  teachings	  of	   Islam,	  and	  the	  prophet	  Muhammad	  are	  extremely	   important	   in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Taliban’s	  initial	  ideology.	  Historian	  Seth	  Jones	  asserts	  that	   “The	   1979	   Soviet	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   jihad	  against	  Soviet	  forces,	  was	  critical	  to	  the	  radicalization	  of	  Deobandi	  and	  other	  militant	   groups”63 .	   Jones	   therefore	   argues	   that	   the	   Soviet	   invasion	   and	  subsequent	   occupation	   of	   Afghanistan	   fueled	   the	   desire	   of	   many	   militant	  groups	   in	   Pakistan	   and	   in	   the	   Arab	   world	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   jihadist	   ideas	  already	  being	  perpetrated	  in	  the	  madrassas.	  Additionally,	  within	  Afghanistan,	  removing	   Russian	   and	   communist	   influence	  was	   also	   described	   as	   a	   jihad:	  “By	  framing	  the	  conflict	  as	  a	  jihad,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  unite	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  and	  deprive	  the	  Kabul	  government	  of	  legitimacy”64.	  	  The	  Taliban	  also	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  jihad,	  and	  wanted	  to	  restore	  legitimacy	  to	  Afghanistan’s	  system	  of	  governance.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  as	  the	  Taliban	  is	  establishing	  in	  Pakistan,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  is	  also	  establishing	  itself	  under	  similar	   ideas	  of	   jihad	   in	  Afghanistan.	   	   Jihad	   is	   a	   central	   concept	   to	  both	  Al-­‐
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Qaeda	   and	   the	   Taliban,	   and	   yet,	   both	   organizations	   use	   jihad	   in	   different	  ways.	  Though	  the	  jihad	  in	  Afghanistan	  was	  the	  initial	  focus	  for	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  the	  importance	   quickly	   became	   the	   global	   jihad.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   Taliban	  continuously	   focuses	  on	  Afghanistan,	   like	   the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	   in	  Egypt	  does	  with	  Egyptian	  politics.	  	  In	  examining	  the	  stark	  differences	  within	  Islamism,	  it	  is	  also	  valuable	  to	   compare	   the	   differing	   reactions	   of	   the	   Taliban	   and	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood	  to	  perceived	  failure	  of	  Islamic	  rule	  in	  both	  their	  countries.	  For	  the	  Taliban,	  this	  becomes	  a	  problem	  solved	  by	  jihad	  almost	  immediately,	  and	  the	   Taliban	   chooses	   to	   fight	   against	   the	   current	   regime.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  chooses	  to	  attempt	  to	  establish	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  government	  in	  hopes	  that	  this	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  prominent	  role	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	   public	   sphere.	   The	   Taliban’s	   desire	   to	   overthrow	   the	  mujahedeen,	   and	  establish	   renewed	   Islamic	   order	   perhaps	   stems	   from	   the	   chaos	   in	  Afghanistan	   in	   the	   early	   90’s,	   and	   before.	   Though	   the	   Brotherhood	   was	  created	  during	  a	  tumultuous	  time	  in	  Egyptian	  history,	  there	  was	  not	  the	  same	  anarchy	  that	  there	  was	  in	  Afghanistan	  under	  the	  mujahedeen.	  	  	   Early	   leadership	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   the	   ideological	   development	   of	   the	  Taliban.	  Mullah	  Omar,	  it	  is	  argued,	  was	  given	  a	  sort	  of	  a	  divine	  status	  because	  of	  his	  perceived	  devotion	   to	   the	   Islamic	   faith.	   “Some	  Taliban	  say	  Omar	  was	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chosen	  as	  their	  leader	  not	  for	  his	  political	  or	  military	  ability,	  but	  for	  his	  piety	  and	   his	   unswerving	   belief	   in	   Islam.	   Others	   say	   he	   was	   chosen	   by	   God”65.	  	  Mullah	  Omar	  uses	  these	  ideas	  to	  his	  advantage	  when	  the	  Taliban	  attempts	  to	  take	   power	   in	   Kabul	   through	   heavy	   use	   of	   religious	   ideology	   in	   order	   to	  solidify	  his	  legitimacy	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  what	  could,	  in	  its	  initial	  stages,	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  movement	  of	  young	  Islamic	  scholars	  and	  jihadists.	  “In	  order	  to	  establish	  his	   ideological	   credentials	   and	  attract	  new	  recruits,	  Mullah	  Omar	   turned	   to	  the	   legend	   of	   the	   Prophet	  Muhammad’s	   cloak”66.	  Mullah	  Omar	  managed	   to	  create	  such	  a	  following	  around	  his	  leadership	  that	  his	  decisions	  were	  seldom	  questioned.	   The	   use	   of	   Muhammad’s	   cloak	   is	   also	   an	   important	   symbol	   in	  understanding	  Mullah	  Omar’s	  political	  aims	  with	  regard	  to	  Islam.	  The	  act	  of	  dressing	   himself	   in	   the	   cloak	   of	   the	   Prophet	   and	   the	   comparison	   it	   drew	  between	  Mullah	  Omar	   and	   the	  Prophet	   indicate	   that	   the	  Taliban	  wished	   to	  establish	  a	  Qur’anic	  state	  that	  existed	  during	  Muhammad’s	  life.	  	  	   Direct	  comparisons	  between	  an	  organizational	  leader	  and	  the	  Prophet	  are	  rare	   in	   the	  organizations	  discussed	   in	   this	  paper’s	  case	  studies.	  Though	  organizational	   leaders	   are	   often	   elevated	   to	   a	   higher,	   and	   almost	   spiritual	  status,	   particularly	   in	   the	   cases	   of	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   Osama	   bin	   Laden	   and	   the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood’s	  Hasan	  al-­‐Banna,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  direct	  comparison	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between	   these	   men	   and	   the	   Prophet	   himself.	   This	   highlights	   the	   use	   of	  convincing	   rhetoric,	   and	   ideas	  about	   the	  ummah	   of	   the	  Prophet	   that	   rallied	  the	   people	   of	   Afghanistan	   around	   the	   Taliban.	   There	   are	   direct	   similarities	  between	   the	   cult	   of	   personality	   created	   around	   Mullah	   Omar	   and	   that	   of	  Osama	   bin	   Laden.	   Bin	   Laden	   was	   strong	   because	   of	   his	   charisma,	   Mullah	  Omar	  because	  of	  his	  piety,	  and	  these	  characteristics	  greatly	  ameliorated	  their	  abilities	  to	  rally	  their	  followers	  around	  the	  cause.	  	  	   Because	  of	   the	   aforementioned	  propaganda	  and	   the	  Taliban’s	   ability	  to	  market	  themselves	  as	  an	  organization	  that	  would	  restore	  peace	  and	  order	  in	  an	  Afghanistan	   that	  was	  plagued	  by	  disorder	  and	  war,	   they	  gained	  quick	  popularity	   in	  their	   initial	   takeover.	  When	  we	  compare	  this	  with	  the	  Taliban	  we	   know	   today,	   even	   when	   one	   understands	   the	   many	   changes	   that	   the	  organization	   has	   gone	   through	   as	   a	   result	   of	   its	   2001	   ousting	   from	  Afghanistan,	   the	   basics	   of	   its	   mission	   remain	   relatively	   static.	   Particularly	  with	   the	   lack	   of	   political	   Islam	   present	   in	   the	   current	   administration,	   the	  Taliban	  today	  still	  insists	  on	  this	  mission.	  	  	   Though	  their	  primary	  aim	  was	  to	  restore	  religious	  order	  and	  govern	  under	  the	  specifications	  of	  Islam,	  the	  Taliban	  did	  something	  very	  different	  in	  practice.	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  establish	  a	  legal	  system	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Sharia’,	  and	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  enforce	  this	  law,	  the	  Taliban	  enforced	  “Traditionally	  Islam	  in	  
 48 
Afghanistan	   has	   been	   immensely	   tolerant-­‐to	   other	   Muslim	   sects,	   other	  religions	  and	  modern	  lifestyles”67.	   In	  the	  view	  of	  Ahmed	  Rashid,	  a	  Pakistani	  journalist,	   the	  Taliban’s	   legal	   policies	   therefore	   represent	   a	   break	   from	   the	  ways	  in	  which	  Sharia	  was	  used	  in	  law	  prior	  to	  the	  Taliban’s	  rule.	  Sharia	  law	  was	   used	   as	   the	   prominent	   legal	   system	   of	   Afghanistan	   until	   192568.	   The	  Taliban	  wished	  to	  ensure	  that	  order	  was	  quickly	  established,	  and,	  one	  could	  see	   the	   chaos	   created	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   different	   Muslim	   sects	   in	   the	  mujahedeen	   era	   as	   a	   factor	   in	   their	   extremely	   harsh	   stance	   towards	   other	  Muslim	  sects,	  religions,	  and	  lifestyles.	  	  	   The	   backgrounds	   of	   prominent	   Taliban	   leaders	   also	   provides	   some	  explanation	   for	   their	  harsh	   legal	   codes.	  Rashid	  argues	   “The	  Taliban	   leaders	  were	  all	  from	  the	  poorest,	  most	  conservative,	  least	  literate	  southern	  Pashtun	  provinces	  of	  Afghanistan.	   In	  Mullah	  Omar’s	  village	  women	  had	  always	  gone	  around	   fully	  veiled	  and	  no	  girl	  had	  ever	  gone	  to	  school	  because	   there	  were	  none.”69	  Rashid	   is	   therefore	   arguing	   that	   the	   socioeconomic	   status	   of	   the	  Taliban	   informed	   their	   beliefs	   on	   conservative	   practice,	   such	   as	   women	  attending	  school.	  He	  also	  argues	  “Their	  recruits-­‐the	  orphans,	  the	  rootless,	  the	  lumpen	  proletariat	  from	  the	  war	  and	  the	  refugee	  camps-­‐had	  been	  brought	  up	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in	   a	   totally	   male	   society.”70	  When	   the	   Taliban	   was	   first	   introduced	   to	   the	  American	  media	  in	  2001,	  their	  harsh	  treatment	  of	  women	  was	  the	  target	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  media	  attention.	  As	  Rashid	  discusses,	  however,	  this	  was	  more	  a	  product	  of	  socioeconomic	  status	  than	  something	  that	  permeates	  the	  general	  ideology	  of	  the	  Taliban.	  Because	  the	  American	  media	  has	  put	  so	  much	  focus	  on	   the	   Taliban,	   they	   also	   imply	   that	   this	   is	   the	   norm	   for	   Islamist	  organizations.	   As	   has	   been	   previously	   established,	   the	   harsh	   legal	   codes	   of	  the	  Taliban	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  norm.	  	  	   Jones	  argues,	  “While	  it	  was	  a	  detestable	  regime	  that	  committed	  gross	  human-­‐rights	  violations,	   the	  Taliban	  was	  successful	   in	  establishing	   law	  and	  order	  throughout	  most	  of	  Afghanistan.”71	  The	  key	  element	  that	  Jones	  argues	  established	   the	   Taliban’s	   legitimacy	   was	   their	   ability	   to	   keep	   their	   people	  safe.	  For	   Jones,	   the	   fall	  of	   the	  Taliban	   in	  2001	  had	  absolutely	  no	  bearing	  on	  their	   control	   of	   the	   country.	   For	   one	   in	   Afghanistan’s	   history,	   Jones	   states	  “There	  was	  no	  Pashtun	  opposition”72.	  Rather,	  for	  Jones,	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Taliban	  was	   concerned	   only	   with	   the	   alliance	   Mullah	   Omar	   struck	   with	   Al-­‐Qaeda.	  “Mullah	   Omar	   had	   been	   willing	   to	   shy	   away	   from	   a	   relationship	   with	   bin	  Laden,	   the	   United	   States	   might	   have	   left	   the	   Taliban	   alone.	   Instead,	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Afghanistan	   became	   a	   nexus	   for	   the	   Taliban’s	   radical	   Deobandism	   and	   al	  Qa’ida’s	  global	  jihad.”73.	  	  	  	   In	  2001,	  the	  Taliban	  was	  removed	  from	  power	  during	  the	  US	  invasion	  following	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  9/11.	  The	  Taliban	  fled,	  mostly	  to	  Pakistan,	  and	  began	   to	   reform	   themselves	   into	   the	   insurgent	  movement	   that	  plagues	  US	   forces	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	   Pakistani	   people	   today.	   With	   this	  reorganization	  came	  ideological	  change.	  In	  his	  book	  “Koran,	  Kalashnikov	  and	  Laptop:	   The	   Neo-­‐Taliban	   Insurgency	   in	   Afghanistan”,	   journalist	   Antonio	  Giustozzi	   argues	   when	   discussing	   the	   reasons	   for	   a	   reorganization	   of	   the	  Talban	   into	  an	   insurgency	  movement	   “It	   is	  most	   likely	   that	   for	   ‘ideological’	  reasons	  they	  just	  never	  accepted	  defeat	  and	  thought	  it	  was	  their	  duty	  to	  fight	  on.” 74 .	   Giustozzi	   also	   argues	   that	   this	   ideology	   he	   mentions	   is	   largely	  reflective	  of	  the	  Taliban’s	  old	  ideology	  “This	  ‘ideology’	  could	  be	  described	  as	  a	  mix	  of	  the	  most	  conservative	  village	  Islam	  with	  Deobandi	  doctrines,	  with	  a	  stress	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  ritual	  modes	  of	  behavior”75.	  	  The	   “Neo-­‐Taliban’s”	   ideology	   had	   adapted	   from	   the	   old	   Taliban	   in	   a	  number	  of	  ways:	  “They	  seem	  to	  have	  absorbed	  from	  their	  foreign	  jihadists	  a	  more	  flexible	  and	  less	  orthodox	  attitude	  towards	  imported	  technologies	  and	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techniques”76.	   He	   also	   argues	   that	   “the	   Neo-­‐Taliban	   became	   much	   more	  integrated	  in	  the	  international	  jihadist	  movement	  after	  2001…Their	  rhetoric	  featured	   concepts	   such	   as	   ‘global	   Christian	  war	   against	   Islam’”77.	   Giustozzi	  argues	   that	   because	   the	   Neo-­‐Taliban	   becomes	   more	   integrated	   into	   the	  international	  system	  through	  the	  international	  jihadist	  movement.	  This	  has	  a	  huge	   effect	   on	   the	   Taliban’s	   religious	   ideology,	   because,	   as	   Giustozzi	  previously	  argues,	  their	  focus	  on	  ritual	  which	  stemmed	  from	  village	  practices	  informed	   much	   of	   the	   Taliban’s	   strict	   ideology	   until	   2002	   when	   the	  insurgency	  re-­‐organized	  itself.	  “Politics,	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  ‘old	  Taliban’,	  was	  reduced	  to	  the	  demand	  of	  an	  orthodox	  application	  of	  the	  Shariah,	  based	  on	  a	  rigid	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Sunna”78.	  	  Their	   integration	   into	   an	   international	   system	   and	   embrace	   of	  technology	   draws	   some	   comparisons	   to	  Al-­‐Qaeda.	   As	   previously	   stated,	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   is	   extremely	  modern	   in	   the	  way	   that	   they	   embrace	   an	   international	  system,	   and	   see	   jihad	   as	   an	   international	  problem.	  Though	   the	  Taliban	   still	  focuses	   on	   Afghanistan	   in	   their	   jihadist	   ideas,	   they	   have	   embraced	   the	  international	   system	   to	   various	   degrees	   as	   they	   search	   for	   funding	   and	  support.	   Funding	   comes	   from	   all	   over	   the	   Islamic	  world,	   and	   this	   does	   not	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ideologically	   trouble	   them.	  Much	   like	   the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood,	   the	   Taliban	  wishes	   to	   rally	   the	   Islamic	  world	   to	   assist	   in	   ensuring	   that	   their	   country	   is	  governed	  in	  Islamic	  terms.	  	  The	   vision	   of	   the	   “Neo-­‐Taliban”	   is	   extremely	   different	   from	   the	  organization	   that	   governed	   Afghanistan	   until	   2001.	   The	   organization	   has	  undergone	   tremendous	   change	   to	   ensure	   they	   are	   viable	   in	   the	   current	  world.	  In	  an	  article	  in	  The	  New	  Yorker	  detailing	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  current	  Taliban.	  Steve	  Coll	  argues,	  	  “The	  Taliban	  today	  are	  diverse	  and	  fractured.	  Some	  old-­‐school	   leaders,	  who	  served	   in	  Mullah	  Omar’s	  cabinet	  or	  as	   governors	   during	   the	   nineteen-­‐nineties,	   belong	   to	   a	  council	   known	   as	   the	   Quetta	   Shura,	   named	   for	   the	  Pakistani	   city	   in	   which	   many	   Taliban	   have	   enjoyed	  sanctuary	  since	  2001.	  This	  is	  the	  group	  whose	  members	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  most	  ready	  to	  consider	  coming	  in	  from	  the	   cold.	   Other	   factions,	   such	   as	   the	   Haqqani	   network,	  based	  in	  North	  Waziristan,	  which	  has	   long-­‐standing	  ties	  to	   the	   I.S.I.,	   are	   regarded	   as	   more	   malicious	   and	   more	  susceptible	   to	   Pakistan’s	   control.	   Inside	   Afghanistan,	  young	   Taliban	   commanders	   fight	   locally	   and	   often	  viciously,	  oblivious	  of	  international	  diplomacy.	  Yalta	  this	  is	  not.”79	  This	  quote	  demonstrates	   that	   the	  United	  States	  must	  engage	   the	  Taliban	   in	  order	   to	   further	   her	   own	   interests	   in	   Afghanistan.	   Additionally,	   the	   “Neo-­‐Taliban”	  is	  a	  Taliban	  that	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  American	  popular	  media.	  Rather,	  
                                                79	  Coll,	  Steve.	  "The	  Obama	  Administration	  and	  the	  Taliban."	  the	  New	  Yorker	  (2011)	  http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/02/28/110228taco_talk_coll.	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when	  one	  thinks	  “Taliban”,	   it	   is	  still	  equated	  to	  old	  men	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	  women	  in	  burquas.	  Their	  developments	  throughout	  the	  21st	  century	  support	  the	   hypothesis	   in	   arguing	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	   one	   definition	   of	   Islamism,	  and	  also	  show	  that	   Islamism	  is	  a	   tradition	  that	   is	  constantly	  changing,	  even	  within	  its	  organizations.	  	  
The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  in	  Egypt	  International	   politics	   understands	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   as	   an	  organization	  that	  has	  embraced	  democracy	  as	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  political	  power,	  and	  disseminating	  ideas	  of	  political	  Islam.	  Particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	   uprising	   in	   Egypt	   and	   approaching	   parliamentary	   elections,	   the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  increased	  international	  attention	  in	  the	  past	  two	  years.	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  is	  often	  touted	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	   influential	   organizations	   in	   the	   Middle	   East.	   The	   Brotherhood	   is	  currently	   listed	   as	   the	   second	   biggest	   charitable	   organization	   worldwide,	  behind	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  case	  study,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	   the	  Muslim	   Brotherhood	   in	   Egypt,	   and	   not	   on	   other	   branches	   in	   North	  Africa,	  Yemen,	  or	  elsewhere.	  	   The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  has	  changed	  dramatically	  as	  an	  organization	  over	  time.	  What	  began	  as	  an	  underground	  militant	  movement	  in	  the	  1920’s	  transformed	   into	   a	   non-­‐violent	   political	   movement	   wishing	   to	   embrace	   a	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democratic	   system	   as	   a	  means	   of	   growing	   political	   power.	   This	   decision	   is	  somewhat	  controversial	  with	  regard	  to	  other	  Islamist	  movements.	  Zawahiri	  himself	   took	   issue	   with	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   back	   in	   the	   1980’s.	  Assessing	   this	   in	   light	  of	   the	  central	   research	  question	  shows	   that	  previous	  notions	   in	   popular	   American	   media	   of	   Islamism	   applies	   very	   little	   to	   the	  Muslim	   Brotherhood	   currently.	   The	   possibility	   that	   of	   an	   Islamist	  organization	   that	  embraces	  democracy,	  and	  democratic	  processes	   is	   largely	  unheard	  of	   in	  American	  media	  portrayals	  of	  any	  Islamist	  organizations,	  and	  particularly	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  As	  this	  case	  study	  assesses	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  Brotherhood	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  the	  democratic	  system,	  the	  main	  research	  question	  and	  hypothesis	  will	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐visited	  in	  light	  of	  this.	  As	  was	   discussed	   in	   more	   depth	   in	   the	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   case	   study,	   Zawahiri	   takes	  particular	   issue	   with	   this	   stance.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   intellectual	  development	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  over	  time,	  one	  must	  began	  with	  its	  founding.	  	  	   Hasan	  al-­‐Banna,	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Brotherhood,	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  influential	  figure	  in	  the	  intellectual	  roots	  of	  the	  Brotherhood.	  Hasan	  al-­‐Banna	  was	   well	   educated	   in	   his	   small	   hometown	   of	   Mahmudiyya,	   where	   he	   was	  learned	   in	  both	   “…classical	   Islamic	   learning	  and	   the	  emotional	  discipline	  of	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Sufism”80.	  When	  Banna	  arrived	   in	  Cairo	   in	   the	  1920’s,	  he	   found	  much	  to	  be	  desired	  in	  the	  people	  of	  Cairo’s	  integration	  of	  religion	  in	  their	  everyday	  lives.	  In	   the	   1920’s,	   religion	   was	   not	   playing	   the	   prominent	   role	   that	   Banna	  envisioned	  it	  would	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  as	  Egypt	  began	  to	  imagine	  itself	  as	  an	   independent	  nation,	  many	  different	  political	  parties	  emerged,	  none	  of	  which	   proposed	   the	   Islamic	   state	   that	   Banna	   and	   many	   of	   his	   followers	  envisioned.	  Richard	  Mitchell,	  an	  associate	  professor	  of	  Near	  Eastern	  History	  at	   the	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  highlights	   this	  struggle	  by	  summarizing	  what	  Banna	   saw	   as	   some	   of	   the	   serious	   problems	   with	   Egyptian	   spiritual	   and	  political	  life	  …the	  post-­‐war	   ‘orientations	   to	   apostasy	   and	   on	   tradition	   and	  orthodoxy…the	   books,	   newspapers,	   and	   magazines,	   which	  propogated	   those	   ideas	   whose	   sole	   goal	   was	   ‘the	   weakening	  influence	  of	  religion’81.	  	  	  Banna	   would	   soon	   discover	   he	   was	   not	   alone	   in	   his	   discontent.	   He	   joined	  another	   religious	   group	   in	   his	   early	   years	   in	   Cairo,	   the	   Islamic	   Society	   for	  Nobility	   and	   Character.	   Banna	   also	   found	   himself	   amongst	   a	   group	   of	  individuals	  that	   felt	   the	  anxiety	  that	  Banna	  did	  over	  the	  state	  of	  Egypt.	  “’No	  one	   but	   God	   knows	   how	  many	   nights	   we	   spent	   reviewing	   the	   state	   of	   the	  
                                                
80 Richard Mitchell, “Society of Muslim Brothers”, (Oxford: 1969), 3 
81 Ibid, 4 
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nation…analyzing	  the	  sickness,	  thinking	  of	  the	  possible	  remedies…’”82.	  In	  his	  years	  before	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Brotherhood,	  Banna	  was	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	   a	   variety	   of	   other	   Islamic	   organizations,	   the	   like	   Young	   Men’s	   Muslim	  Association,	   and	   the	   Majallat	   al-­Fath,	   which	   represented	   a	   grouping	   of	  conservative	  Muslim	  organizations.	  Banna	  was	   compelled	   to	  begin	  his	   own	  organization	  to	  right	  the	  many	  wrongs	  he	  was	  in	  Egypt	  through	  a	  conviction	  that	  other	  religious	  groups	  did	  not	  address	  the	  breadth	  and	  depth	  of	   issues	  that	  would	  bring	  “faith	  to	  the	  people”83.	  	  	   Banna	  sought	  out	  religious	  scholars	  and	  elders	  in	  Cairo,	  and	  began	  to	  grow	  his	  own	  group	  of	  followers.	  The	  Brotherhood	  was	  founded	  in	  1928,	  and	  grew	  from	  a	  small	  group	  of	  followers	  that	  Banna	  developed	  through	  his	  work	  in	   Isma’iliyya,	   a	   small	   town	   near	   the	   Suez	   Canal.	   Banna’s	   leadership	   was	  integral	  to	  the	  Brotherhood,	  and	  it	  was	  his	  vision	  for	  addressing	  the	  religious	  problems	  in	  Egypt	  and	  bringing	  Islamic	  faith	  back	  to	  the	  people	  that	  held	  the	  Brotherhood	   together.	   The	   Brotherhood	   stayed	   in	   Isma’iiyya	   to	   grow	   its	  membership,	   but	   shortly	   moved	   back	   to	   Cairo,	   and	   began	   to	   hold	  conferences.	  The	  purpose	  of	  these	  conferences	  were	  both	  to	  discuss	  and	  plan	  action,	   and	   ratify	  material	   that	   had	   been	  previously	   decided	   on.	   At	   its	   fifth	  conference,	   the	   intellectual	   aims	   of	   the	  Brotherhood	  were	   firmly	   solidified.	  
                                                
82 Ibid, 5 
83 Ibid, 5 
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These	  were	  identified	  as	  	  “…the	  insistence	  on	  (1)	  Islam	  as	  a	  total	  system,	  complete	  unto	  itself,	  and	  the	  final	  arbiter	  of	  life	  in	  all	  its	  categories;	  (2)	   an	   Islam	   formulated	   from	   and	   based	   on	   its	   two	  primary	   sources,	   the	   revelation	   in	   the	   Qur’an	   and	   the	  wisdom	   of	   the	   Prophet	   in	   the	   Sunna;	   and	   (3)	   an	   Islam	  applicable	  to	  all	  times	  and	  places”84	  	  These	   aims	   appear	   very	   similar	   to	   many	   Islamist	   organizations.	   First,	   the	  definition	  of	   Islam	  as	   a	   “total	   system”	   is	  one	   that	  we	   see	   repeated	   in	  many	  Islamist	   intellectuals	  and	  organizations.	  Referring	  back	   to	  Maududi,	  and	  his	  argument	  that	  “revolutionary	  ideology	  and	  programme	  which	  seeks	  to	  alter	  the	  social	  order	  of	  the	  world	  and	  rebuild	  it	  in	  conformity	  with	  its	  own	  tenets	  and	  ideals.”85,	  one	  can	  see	  similarity	  between	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood’s	  idea	  of	   a	   “total	   system”,	   and	   Maududi’s	   assertion	   of	   Islam	   as	   a	   “revolutionary	  ideology”.	   	   This	   idea	   of	   a	   “total	   system”	   also	   resonates	   with	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	  particularly	   when	   transnational	   jihad	   becomes	   an	   intrinsic	   part	   of	   their	  ideological	  aims.	  	  These	  aims	  also	  influenced	  the	  future	  development	  of	  Sayyid	  Qutb,	  an	  early	   member	   of	   the	   Brotherhood	   himself.	   These	   initial	   broad	   aims	   of	   the	  Muslim	   Brotherhood	   will	   remain	   the	   same,	   however,	   one	   will	   see	   the	  intrinsic	   effects	   of	   the	   political	   and	   social	   climate	   in	   Egypt,	   and	   how	   this	  political	   and	   social	   climate	   informs	   the	   approach	   to	   politics	   of	   the	  
                                                
84 Ibid, 14 
85 Abul A’la Maududi, “Jihad in Islam”, 5 
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Brotherhood.	  	  	   The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  aimed,	  in	  its	  initial	  founding,	  to	  address	  the	  spiritual	  climate	  of	  Egypt,	  rather	  than	  the	  political	  climate.	  This	  decision	  was	  primarily	  a	  result	  of	  Banna’s	  focus	  on	  spiritual	  life.	  However,	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  “…socio-­‐economic	  crisis	  and	  the	  continued	  spread	  of	  secularism…”86,	  the	  Brotherhood	  became	  more	  involved	  in	  Egyptian	  politics	  as	  the	  1930’s	  wore	  on.	  Another	   factor	   in	   the	  Brotherhood’s	   increased	   approach	   in	  politics	  was	  colonial	   influence	   in	   the	  Middle	   East.	   The	   Palestinian	   crisis	   became	   a	   huge	  source	   of	   discontent	   for	   the	   Brotherhood,	   and	   became	   known	   as	   the	  “external	   political	   struggle”87.	   Here,	   one	   can	   see	   similarities	   between	   the	  Brotherhood	   and	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   in	   their	   reactions	   to	   perceived	   attacks	   on	   the	  Muslim	  world	   elsewhere.	   The	   struggle	   in	   Palestine	   has	   been	   an	   important	  vector	  for	  Al-­‐Qeada’s	  hatred	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Al	  Banna	  in	  particular	  became	  an	  extremely	  important	  political	  figure.	  “Al	  Banna’s	  political	   activism	  became	  evident;	   for	  example,	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  he	  cooperated	  with	  Ismail	  Siddiqi,	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  on	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  inside	  Egypt…”88.	  This	  involvement	  in	  state	  affairs	  represents	  a	  shift	  in	  culture	  from	  the	  previous	  approach	  that	  the	  Brotherhood	  took	  in	  building	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an	  Egypt,	  and	  broader	  Islamic	  community	  that	  conformed	  to	  the	  proof	  texts.	  The	   intellectual	   aims	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   paragraph	   did	   not	   have	  explicit	  mention	  of	   involvement	   in	   the	  Egyptian	  political	  process.	  Here,	  one	  can	  also	  draw	  similarities	  between	  the	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  Taliban,	  as	  both	  organizations	   are	   involved	   in	   political	   processes	   of	   their	   governments.	  Though	  this	   is	   just	   through	  cooperation	  with	  the	  government	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood,	   government	   interaction	   is	   recognized	   as	   an	  important	  vehicle	  to	  ensure	  that	  Egypt’s	  spiritual	  character	  was	  developed	  to	  Banna’s	   liking.	   The	   Taliban	   also	   recognize	   government	   interaction	   and	  political	  power	  as	   an	   important	  part	  of	   implementing	   their	   ideology,	  hence	  their	  desire	  to	  take	  power	  in	  Kabul	  in	  1996.	  	  	   The	  Brotherhood	  approached	   crisis	  when	   the	   government	   called	   for	  the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   organization	   in	   1948,	   caused	   by	   a	   period	   of	  marked	  instability	  between	   the	  government	  and	   the	  Brotherhood.	  Banna	  wished	   to	  merge	  the	  Brotherhood	  with	  the	  Muslim	  Youth	  Association,	  and	  submitted	  a	  proposal	   to	   turn	   the	   Brotherhood	   into	   a	   religious	   group	   to	   King	   Farouq.	  Banna	  argued	  that	  the	  Brotherhood	  would	  be	  “a	  religious	  group	  which	  would	  help	   the	   monarchy	   resist	   communism…”89.	   The	   monarchy	   rejected	   this	  proposal,	  causing	  a	  split	  between	  the	  Brotherhood	  and	  the	  government.	  This	  caused	  internal	  disdain	  towards	  the	  monarchy,	  and	  eventually	  lead	  to	  Prime	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Minister	   Naqrashi’s	   assassination	   by	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Brotherhood90.	   The	  Brotherhood’s	   involvement	   in	   uprisings	   and	   unrest	   during	   World	   War	   II	  drew	   attention	   to	   them,	   and	   the	   government	   subsequently	   attacked	   the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  Additionally,	  in	  1947,	  the	  Brotherhood	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  number	  of	   internal	   schisms.	  Namely,	  Banna	  had	  disputes	  with	  his	  deputy	  over	   constitutional	   specifics	   of	   the	   Brotherhood,	   and	   there	   were	   also	  questions	  over	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  general	  secretary91.	  The	  internal	  struggle	  of	   the	   Brotherhood	   combined	   with	   external	   pressures	   to	   test	   the	  organization.	   Because	   of	   the	   negative	   attention	   the	   Brotherhood	   received	  throughout	  Egypt	  during	  this	  time,	  Banna	  was	  murdered.	  	  	   In	  this	  early	  period	  of	  the	  Brotherhood,	  some	  violence	  and	  what	  might	  be	   considered	   terrorist	   acts	   occured.	   Under	   Banna,	   a	   Secret	   Unit	   was	  established.	   Though	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   ascertain	   exactly	   what	   the	   unit	   was	  involved	  in,	  Banna’s	  argument	  was	  that	  “…the	  paramilitary	  group	  was	  merely	  preparing	   for	   combat	   in	  Palestine…”92.	   This	  draws	   similarities	  between	   the	  early	  Brotherhood	  and	  both	  the	  Taliban	  and	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  because	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  also	  claimed	   they	  were	   preparing	   the	  many	  men	   they	   trained	   in	   combat	   in	   the	  early	   stages	   for	   the	   jihad	   in	   Afghanistan.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that,	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however,	   that	   violence	   within	   the	   organization	   was	   confined	   to	   a	   small	  group,	   and	   the	   actions	   of	   said	   group	   were	   kept	   secret	   from	   even	  organizational	   members.	   This	   perhaps	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   Brotherhood	  did	   not	   want	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   violent	   organization,	   perhaps	   because	   of	  concerns	   of	   legitimacy,	   particularly	   because	   during	   this	   time,	   the	  Brotherhood	  wished	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   legitimate	   political	   organization	   in	  Egypt.	  This	  desire	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  next	  leader,	  Hassan	  Hudaybi,	  because	  he	  wanted	  the	  Brotherhood	  to	  “adopt	  a	  more	  professional	  outlook.”93.	  	  Though	   a	   Secret	   Unit	   developed	   under	   Banna,	   there	   was	   very	   little	  
jihadist	   discourse	   in	   the	   early	   Brotherhood.	   As	   previously	   discussed,	   the	  focus	   was	   more	   on	   improving	   the	   spiritual	   life	   in	   Egypt,	   and	   promoting	  governance	   that	   is	  more	   centered	   around	   Islam.	  When	   examining	   both	   the	  Taliban	  and	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  ideas	  of	  jihad	  and	  violence	  are	  inherent	  specificities	  of	  the	  organization’s	  core	  aims	  and	  actions.	  For	  both	  the	  Taliban	  and	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  
jihad,	   and	   specifically,	   jihad	   in	   Afghanistan	   are	   important	   parts	   of	   their	  founding	   and	   development.	   Therefore,	   Al-­‐Qaeda’s	   readings	   of	   Qutb	   are	  motivated	  by	  ideas	  of	  jihad.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Brotherhood	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  a	  
jihad	   in	   Egypt,	   because	   many	   Egyptians	   are	   already	   believers.	   The	  Brotherhood	  rather	  focuses	  on	  renewing	  their	  faith	  and	  piety,	  and	  promoting	  Islam	   in	   governance.	   To	   bring	   this	   back	   to	   the	   larger	   project,	   and	   research	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question,	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  Islamist	  scholar	  can	  become	  the	  basis	  for	  violence	  and	  non-­‐violence	  simultaneously	  demonstrates	  the	  breadth	  of	  interpretation	  within	  the	  tradition	  of	  Islamism.	  This	  further	  supports	  the	  idea	  that	  Islamism	  cannot	  be	  siphoned	  into	  one	  category.	  	  	   The	  Brotherhood’s	  next	  leader,	  Hassan	  Hudaybi,	  marked	  some	  serious	  changes	   in	   the	   Brotherhood’s	   approach	   to	   politics,	   and	   one	   can	   see	   a	   turn	  away	  from	  these	  violent	  tendencies.	  One	  of	  al-­‐Hudaybi’s	  first	  acts	  as	  the	  new	  
Murshid	  was	  to	  dissolve	  the	  Secret	  Unit.	  Al-­‐Hudaybi	  was	  extremely	  intent	  on	  this,	   and	   even	   announced	   his	   intent	   to	   resign	  when	   the	   unit	   had	   not	   been	  dissolved	  4	  months	  after	  he	  assumed	   leadership94.	  Al-­‐Hudaybi	   is	   influential	  in	   the	   Brotherhood’s	   tendencies	   towards	   non-­‐violence,	   and	   sets	   up	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   Brotherhood	   that	   will	   carry	   through	   to	   the	   Brotherhood’s	  modern	  Egyptian	  history.	  	  	   Another	   important	   ideological	   shifts	   that	   came	   with	   Hudaybi’s	  leadership	  was	  the	  shift	  from	  political	  discourse	  centered	  around	  the	  ideas	  of	  Banna,	   and	   political	   discourse	   centered	   instead	   around	   the	   ideas	   of	   Sayyid	  Qutb.	   Qutb	   began	   writing	   in	   the	   1950s,	   as	   discussed	   previously,	   and	   his	  concepts	   of	   jahiliyya	   and	   haq	   (‘truth’)	   vs.	   batil	   (‘falsity’).	   Though	   the	   older	  leadership	   of	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   rejected	   such	   concepts,	   Qutb	   had	   a	  great	   deal	   of	   influence,	   particularly	   on	   Hudaybi.	   Because	   Hudaybi	   was	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passionate	   about	   establishing	   a	   non-­‐violent	   movement	   that	   could	   gain	  political	   legitimacy,	  he	  read	  Qutb	  from	  this	  perspective.	   In	  establishing	  haq,	  and	  removing	  batil,	  Hudaybi	  believed	  that	  preaching,	  and	  using	  methods	  that	  did	  not	  end	  in	  violence	  would	  be	  important	  in	  establishing	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  legitimacy.	  	  	   Hudaybi	  wrote	  Du’at	  la	  Qudat	  (Preachers	  not	  Judges)	  shortly	  after	  he	  became	   the	  Murshid,	   and	  was	   hugely	   influential	   in	   defining	   the	   ideological	  ideas	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  under	  his	  leadership	  and	  following.	  It	  was	  also	   an	   instance	   in	   which	   there	   was	   a	   “…negative	   response	   from	   a	   fellow	  proponent	   of	   Islamism	   to	   Qutb’s	   conception	   of	   Islam”95.	   Though	   historians	  studying	  this	  period	  of	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  development	  focus	  a	  great	  deal	  on	  Qutb’s	   writings,	   Du’at	   la	   Qudat	   was	   also	   hugely	   influential.	   The	   work	  “combines	   spiritual	   instruction	   with	   Islamic	   jurisprudence	   (fiqh)”96.	   In	   the	  work,	  there	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  define	  the	  difference	  between	  kufr	  (unbelievers)	  and	  Muslims.	   In	   this	   sense,	  kufr	  are	   individuals	  who	  believes	   “…there	   is	  no	  God,	  and	  He	  is	  not	  One,	  or	  that	  Muhammad	  was	  not	  a	  prophet”97.	  	  	   This	   idea	   of	   kufr	   reflects	   Qutb’s	   idea	   of	   the	   jalahiliyya,	   but	   takes	   a	  slightly	   different	   take	   on	   it.	   In	   Qutb’s	   idea	   of	   the	   jalahiliyya,	   as	   discussed	  previously,	   discusses	   communities	   of	   unbelievers,	   and	   particularly	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references	  the	  Western	  world.	  In	  Qutb’s	  understanding,	  one	  can	  see	  a	  much	  more	   decisive	   attack	   on	   cultural	   values,	   and	   societal	   behaviors.	   In	   the	  assessment	   of	  kufr	   in	  Du’at	   la	  Qudat,	   there	   is	  much	  more	  of	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  individual	  behaviors	  of	  an	  unbeliever.	  The	  previously	  stated	  definition	  of	  kufr	  also	  encompasses	  varying	  forms	  of	  differing	  belief.	  Kufr	  could	  be	  those	  who	  are	   monotheists	   but	   do	   not	   choose	   to	   accept	   Muhammad’s	   role	   as	   the	  prophet	   of	   Allah,	   but	   they	   could	   also	   be	   individuals	   that	   come	   from	  polytheistic	  traditions,	  say,	  Hinduism	  or	  Buddhism.	  	  	   Again,	  one	  must	  compare	  these	  views	  of	  kufr	  and	  the	  interpretations	  of	   the	   jalahiliyya	   and	  compare	   these	   to	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  and	   the	  Taliban.	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  also	  draws	  upon	  Qutb’s	  ideas	  of	  kufr	  and	  the	  jahiliyya.	  However,	  their	  reading	  of	  Qutb’s	   ideas	  on	   these	  concepts	   tends	  much	  more	   towards	  a	   jihadist	   idea	  that	   violence	   is	   necessary	   to	   cleanse	   the	   world	   of	   such	   disbelief.	   Al-­‐Qaeda	  there	   for	   calls	   particularly	   young	   men	   to	   the	   jihad,	   and	   the	   cause	   of	  martyrdom.	   “Almost	   every	   single	   interview	   geared	   toward	   the	   Arab	   and	  Muslim	  worlds	  ends	  with	  a	  call	  for	  those	  youth	  to	  come	  to	  Islam’s	  defense”98.	  In	   contrast,	   the	   Brotherhood	   sees	   preaching	   and	   democracy	   as	   vehicles	  through	  which	  the	  problems	  of	  kufr	  and	  the	   jahaliyya	   can	  be	   lessened.	  This	  differing	   of	   opinion	   on	   Qutb’s	   writings	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   differing	  historical	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  Brotherhood	  and	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  operate.	  Al-­‐Qaeda	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is	  founded	  during	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan,	  and	  therefore,	  jihad	  is	  an	  important	  concept.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   Brotherhood	   was	   more	   motivated	   to	   involve	  themselves	  in	  politics,	  and	  did	  not	  focus	  as	  much	  on	  jihadist	  literature.	  This,	  again,	   supports	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   Islamism	   cannot	   be	   understood	   as	   one	  movement	  and	  ideology.	  	  	   Umar	   al-­‐Tilemansani	   took	   the	   role	   of	   General	   Guide	   in	   1973,	   and	  began	  a	  new	  phase	  of	  leadership	  and	  thought	  within	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  that	  very	  much	  reflected	  many	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  al-­‐Hudaybi.	  Al-­‐Tilemansani	  saw	  political	   pressure	   from	   the	   government,	   and	   general	   lack	   of	   favor	  with	   the	  government	   as	   a	   problem	   for	   the	   Brotherhood	   that	   must	   be	   solved,	   and	  therefore	   sought	   to	   find	   ways	   that	   the	   Brotherhood	   could	   become	   more	  favorable	  to	  the	  government.	  Al-­‐Tilemansani	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  appropriate	  for	   the	   Brotherhood	   to	   become	   more	   focused	   on	   political	   activism,	   and	  embrace	  the	  political	  system,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  focus	  on	  religious	  piety	  that	  had	   previously	   been	   a	   goal	   of	   the	   Brotherhood.	   This	  marked	   a	   changeover	  from	   what	   is	   often	   deemed	   the	   “old	   guard”—older	   members	   of	   the	  Brotherhood	   that	   lived	   through	   Egypt’s	   independence—and	   the	   newer	  members	  of	  the	  Brotherhood.	  	  	   The	   new	   generation	   of	   leaders	   in	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   became	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prominent	  in	  the	  late	  1970s-­‐early	  1980s99.	  The	  new	  generation	  also	  begins	  to	  look	  much	   like	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  represented	   in	  the	  recent	  Egyptian	  elections.	   The	   new	   generation’s	   historical	   exposure	   shaped	   their	   views	   on	  the	   role	   of	   the	   Brotherhood	   in	   Egyptian	   politics.	   This	   generation	   had	   not	  experienced	   the	   oppression	   the	  movement	   did	   during	  Nasser’s	   regime,	   but	  rather,	   had	   been	   exposed	   to	   a	   somewhat	   open	   political	   climate	   defined	   by	  student	   activist	   movements,	   particularly	   the	   Jama’at	   Islamiyya	   (‘Islamic	  student	  movement’)100.	  Because	  of	  interactions	  that	  the	  new	  generation	  had	  much	   interaction	   with	   student	   organizations,	   and	   political	   activism	   in	   this	  sense,	   they	   became	   much	   more	   motivated	   about	   political	   activism	   and	  promoting	  involvement	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  in	  the	  political	  scene	  than	  the	   previous	   leadership	   had.	   This	   is	   also	   the	   time	   when	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood	   officially	   adopts	   a	   policy	   of	   non-­‐violence,	   especially	   after	   the	  Egyptian	   revolution.	   This	   is	   something	   that	   is	   often	   forgotten	   by	  contemporary	  Western	  audiences	  when	  discussing	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood.	  	  	   As	   the	   Brotherhood	   enters	   21st	   century	   politics,	   they	   become	   huge	  propagators	   of	   the	   democratic	   process	   and	   system,	   and	   wished	   to	   be	  involved	   in	   the	   democratic	   process.	   Tarek	   Osman,	   a	   journalist	   and	   scholar	  that	   wrote	   of	   the	   development	   of	   Egypt,	   claims	   “In	   the	   late	   1990s,	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the…Muslim	  Brotherhood	  proposed	  a	  draft	  political	  manifesto,	  seen	  by	  many	  observers	   as	   the	   skeleton	   of	   an	   alternative	   constitution”101.	   In	   the	   2005	  elections	   in	   Egypt,	   the	   Brotherhood’s	   Freedom	   and	   Justice	   party	   was	   the	  most	  popular	  political	  party,	  and	  looked	  poised	  to	  win	  the	  elections	  against	  Mubarak.	   The	   popularity	   of	   the	   Brotherhood	   was	   a	   huge	   factor	   in	   the	  “political	  de-­‐liberalization”102	  that	  occurred	  following	  the	  2005	  elections,	  and	  the	   political	   clout	   the	   Brotherhood	   gained	   was	   problematic	   to	   the	   current	  administration.	  	  	   The	   actualities	   of	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood’s	   development	   are	  extremely	   different	   from	   the	   Western	   understanding	   of	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood.	   Though	   they	   have	   been	   non-­‐violent	   since	   1983,	   many	  Americans	   still	   understand	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   as	   a	   violent	   Islamist	  organization,	  an	  understanding	  that	  is	  entirely	  opposite	  of	  the	  Brotherhood’s	  reality.	   Additionally,	   the	   perpetuation	   of	   democratic	   ideals	   along	   with	  Islamist	   ideology	  completely	  de-­‐bunks	  Western	  conceptions	  of	   Islamism.	   In	  popular	  media,	   there	   is	   no	  mention	   of	   Islamist	   organizations	   that	   are	   also	  democratic	  in	  nature.	  As	  the	  United	  States	  assesses	  its	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  in	  developing	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  Middle	  East,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  them	  to	  not	  immediately	   shirk	   away	   at	   the	   though	   of	   Islam.	   The	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	  
                                                
101 Tarek Osman, “Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak”, (New Haven: 2010), 
100 
102 Mohammed Zahid, “Egypt’s Succession Crisis”, 162 
 68 
perpetuates	   democratic	   ideals	   taught	   in	   schools	   throughout	   the	   United	  States.	  The	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  has	  developed	  and	  changed	  with	  the	  times,	  and	   this	   supports	   the	   initial	   hypothesis	   that	   Islamism	  does	  not	   fit	   into	   one	  category,	  but	  rather,	  represents	  a	  variety	  of	  dynamic	  organizations.	  	  
Conclusion	  	   This	   paper	   sought	   to	   examine	  Western	   understandings	   of	   the	   term	  “Islamism”,	  and	  assess	  whether	  the	  current	  Western	  notions	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  Islamism,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  role	  in	  21st	  century	  politics,	  has	  been	  correct	  thus	  far.	  A	  comparison	  of	  the	  Taliban,	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  all	  finds	   that	   political	   Islam	   represents	   a	   variety	   of	   differing	   ideas.	   These	  ideologies	  change	  as	   the	  world	  modernizes,	  and	  each	   is	   influenced	  by	   their	  historical	  context	  a	  great	  deal.	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  is	  a	  direct	  product	  of	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	   international	   system,	   and	   the	   different	   stages	   of	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood	  all	  reflect	  key	  points	  in	  Egyptian	  history	  and	  development.	  The	  Taliban	   is	   also	   a	   direct	   production	   of	   their	   historical	   context,	   particularly	  with	  relation	  to	  the	  Soviet-­‐Afghan	  War.	  	  	   What	  all	  of	  this	  demonstrates	  is	  the	  necessity	  to	  refrain	  from	  treating	  these	   movements	   as	   one	   cohesive	   ideology.	   Rather,	   they	   represent	   the	  constant	   change	   and	   development	  within	   the	   trend	   of	   political	   Islam	   itself.	  Americans	  view	  Islamism	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world	  as	  unchanging	  and	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regressive.	   Because	   the	   American	   public	   is	   taught	   from	   a	   young	   age	   to	  understand	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  as	  a	  necessity	  in	  any	  forward-­‐moving	  society,	   this	   leads	  to	  automatic	  rejection	  of	  the	   idea	  that	  a	   forward-­‐moving	  society,	  and	  forward-­‐thinking	  ideologies	  can	  exist	  within	  a	  religious	  tradition.	   Additionally,	   9/11	   further	   fostered	   negative	   understandings	   of	  Islamism	  that	  are	  not	  representative	  of	  the	  entire	  tradition.	  Within	  Islamism,	  this	   paper	   has	   seen	   complete	   hatred	   of	   the	  West	   and	   attack	   contrasted	   by	  indifference.	   	  We	   see	   a	   complete	   embrace	   of	   the	   democratic	   system	   and	   a	  vehement	   critique	   of	   the	   flaws	   of	   democracy.	   By	   no	   means	   can	   one	   lump	  these	  organizations	  into	  one	  category.	  	  	   There	   is	   very	   little	   break	   in	   Islam	   between	   religion	   and	   politics.	  Because	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  early	  ummah,	  and	  the	  continued	  discussion	  of	  political	   specifications	   in	   the	  Qur’an,	   the	  hadith,	   and	   the	   sunna,	   Islam	  holds	  political	   ideas	  within	   itself.	   And,	  when	   Islamist	  movements	   develop	  within	  the	   scope	   of	   religion,	   it	   does	   not	   mean	   they	   are	   developing.	   Careful	  consideration	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   Al-­‐Qaeda,	   the	   Taliban,	   and	   the	   Muslim	  Brotherhood	  illustrate	  the	  ability	  of	  Islamist	  organizations	  to	  change	  as	  their	  societies,	   and	   the	   world	   system,	   continues	   to	   develop	   and	   modernize.	   Al-­‐Qaeda	  embraces	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  world	  system	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  policies.	  The	  Taliban,	  while	  still	  holding	   true	   to	   their	   initial	   ideology,	   is	   in	   the	  process	  of	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changing	   their	   own	   means	   of	   achieving	   political	   power	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	  times.	   The	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   has	   embraced	   democracy,	   and	   wishes	   to	  spread	  its	  ideas	  through	  the	  democratic	  system	  itself.	  	  	   These	   organizations	   demonstrate	   that	   understanding	   political	   Islam	  as	   a	   regressive	   tradition	   is	   unrepresentative	   of	   the	   reality.	   Islam	   itself	   is	   a	  discursive	  tradition,	  one	  that	  is	  constantly	  re-­‐evaluating	  itself	  and	  attempting	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  ever	  changing	  political	  systems	  in	  Islamic	  countries,	  and	  the	   broader	   world.	   To	   understand	   that	   because	   Islam	   does	   so	   within	   the	  constraints	   of	   religion,	   it	   implies	   regression,	   is	   detrimental	   to	   the	  relationship	  that	  the	  United	  States	  attempts	  to	  create	  with	  the	  Islamic	  world.	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APPENDIX	  A-­	  Definitions	  of	  Arabic	  terms	  	  
Islah-­‐	  reform	  	  	  
Ummah-­‐	   The	   Islamic	   community;	   a	   term	   that	   begins	   with	   the	   community	  governed	  by	  Muhammad	  	  	  
Islah-­‐	   Critique,	   refers	   to	   a	   state	   of	   ensuring	   a	   state	   of	   virtue	   and	  incorruptibility	  	  
Tajdid-­‐	   Reform/Renewal,	   use	   of	   the	   Qur’an	   and	   Sunna	   to	   define	   the	   true	  spirit	  of	  the	  Islamic	  faith	  	  
Jalahiliyya-­the	  time	  of	  ignorance	  before	  Islam,	  is	  now	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  secular	  modernity.	   Qutb	   uses	   this	   term	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   current	   secular	   community,	  and	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  later	  uses	  this	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  Western	  World.	  	  	  
Islamiliyya-­‐	  the	  Islamic	  community	  	  
Fiqh-­‐	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  	  	  
Haq-­‐	  truth	  	  
Batil-­falsity	  	  
Kufr-­‐	  an	  unbeliever,	  either	  an	  individual	  who	  does	  not	  accept	  monotheism,	  or	  who	  does	  not	  accept	  Islam	  depending	  on	  the	  interpretation	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